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I. INTRODUCTION
Statutory interpretation at the state level is an oft-neglected topic
of legal scholarship.1 Although legal scholars continue to debate the
merits of the various schools of statutory construction, the debate
centers almost entirely on the work performed by federal judges.
When scholars do turn their attention to the interpretive work of
state judges, they generally examine the interpretation of state
constitutional provisions that parallel the federal Constitution and
the pros and cons of the so-called “new judicial federalism.”2 Rarely
is there much discussion as to the possibility that state judges might
approach the task of statutory interpretation differently than their
federal counterparts or that the task of interpreting state statutes
that parallel federal law might raise different concerns than are
raised with respect to constitutional interpretation.3
All of which is somewhat curious. The mere fact that most state
judges, at some point in their careers, obtain the approval of the
electorate for continuation in office would seem to inject a variable
into the interpretive process that is lacking in the federal bench.4
Moreover, even if one assumes (as many judges and scholars do) that
judges approach statutory interpretation in the same manner they
approach constitutional interpretation,5 the interpretation of state
statutes with parallel federal counterparts would seem to raise many
of the same issues that dominate much of the discussion regarding
the propriety of state courts departing from the United States
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal Constitution.

1
See Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts
Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1995) (noting that few recent
commentaries address different set of issues facing state judges construing state statutes).
2
See generally Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New
Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93 (2000) (advocating independent state
constitutional interpretation as means of elevating federal constitutional dialogue); James A.
Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761 (1992)
(arguing that state constitutional discourse is inherently flawed because Americans value
national citizenship over state in definition of individual rights).
3
Kaye, supra note 1, at 20.
4
See infra notes 177-183 and accompanying text.
5
See Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, 75
U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2004) (observing “peculiar agreement between defenders of originalism
and dynamism that constitutional and statutory interpretation should converge”).
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In at least one area of law, the questions of how state judges
approach statutory interpretation and how they should approach
that task when dealing with a state statute that closely parallels
federal law are increasingly taking on greater significance.
Interpretational issues surrounding the various federal employment
discrimination statutes have become exceedingly complex and
politically charged over the past fifteen years.6 The basic command
of most antidiscrimination statutes is straightforward enough:
employers may not discriminate on the basis of particular
characteristics such as race, sex, age, or disability.7 As case law
under these statutes developed and courts were called upon to
interpret the statutes more frequently, however, more complicated
statutory construction issues emerged. From time to time, Congress
stepped in to overrule some of the United States Supreme Court’s
more controversial interpretations.8 Rather than resolving the
controversy, however, congressional response sometimes engendered
future confusion.9
Furthermore, as courts moved beyond some of the
interpretational issues that could arguably be resolved by wellestablished methods of statutory interpretation, the deceptively
simple language of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) forced courts to grapple with
interpretational issues for which the traditional tools of statutory
interpretation—the statutory text and legislative history—provided
little guidance. In an attempt to give form to the language of federal
antidiscrimination law, federal courts have been forced to resort to

6

See Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive Discharge,
77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 309 (2004) (“After more than a decade of litigation under the revised
[Civil Rights Act], it is fair to say that Title VII law has never been more complex and
confusing.”).
7
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (2000); Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000);
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
8
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) & (c) (2000) (modifying statute
in response to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)).
9
See, e.g., Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the
Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1484 (1996)
(noting competing interpretations of Civil Rights Act of 1991 relating to concept of business
necessity in disparate impact claims).
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a form of statutory interpretation that resembles common law
rulemaking far more than traditional statutory interpretation.10
As these types of interpretational issues multiplied and became
more complex at the federal level, state courts confronted similar
issues. At the dawn of the modern era, federal and state
antidiscrimination laws typically ran parallel to one another.
Indeed, in many instances, a state’s antidiscrimination statute was
based upon or used language almost identical to federal law.11 This
fact, coupled with the general principle of construction that federal
decisional law concerning a parallel statute is highly persuasive
(although obviously not controlling),12 meant that a parallel
interpretation of the substantive provisions of a state
antidiscrimination statute was almost a foregone conclusion when
a state appellate court confronted an interpretational issue
previously encountered by the Supreme Court or a majority of
federal appellate courts. However, as interpretational issues at the
federal level became more complex and (in at least some instances)
more controversial, state antidiscrimination law had more
opportunities to “jump the track” and take alternative courses.
Perhaps not surprisingly, a number of state appellate courts in
recent years have declined to follow federal court interpretations of
employment discrimination statutes when dealing with their own
parallel state statutes.13 To be sure, this is not a totally new
phenomenon.14 Nor is the phenomenon of divergent interpretations

10
See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998) (relying on common law
agency principles to formulate rule for deciding when employer is subject to vicarious liability
for hostile work environment created by supervisor); Motzer v. Global Assoc., No. 448495, 2001
WL 811713, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 2001) (“Ellerth, although nominally a statutory
case, stands in the highest tradition of common law decision making, striking a fair balance
between the interests of employees and employers in a developing area of the law.”).
11
See Alex Long, State Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model for Amending the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 597, 627 (2004) (noting that just prior to federal
enactment of ADA, numerous states used federal Rehabilitation Act as model for their
disability discrimination statutes).
12
See, e.g., Chmielewski v. Xermac Inc., 580 N.W.2d 817, 821 (Mich. 1998) (noting that
analogous federal precedents are persuasive but not binding in statutory interpretation).
13
See infra notes 71-199 and accompanying text.
14
See, e.g., Mass. Elec. Co. v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 375 N.E.2d 1192,
1200 (Mass. 1978) (refusing to adopt Supreme Court’s rationale in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 134-35 (1976), that discrimination on basis of pregnancy is not
equivalent of sex discrimination).
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of parallel statutes necessarily limited to the employment
discrimination field.15 Nevertheless, there has almost certainly been
a marked increase in recent years in the number of instances in
which state antidiscrimination law has jumped the track of federal
antidiscrimination law. Examples range from what conditions
qualify as disabilities16 to under what circumstances an employer
can be held vicariously liable for sexual harassment committed by
a supervisor.17
Even where state discrimination statutes have not yet jumped the
track, the potential for divergent interpretations has increased.
Recent interpretative issues decided by the Supreme Court—such as
whether an age discrimination plaintiff may proceed under a
disparate impact theory18 and what the standard in such cases
should be,19 whether a cause of action for reverse age discrimination
exists,20 under what circumstances an employer may be held
vicariously liable for harassment resulting in a constructive
discharge,21 and whether the venerable McDonnell Douglas
framework should remain the standard for analyzing disparate
treatment claims22—are waiting to be examined under parallel state
antidiscrimination statutes.23
This Article posits that, as the stakes in employment
discrimination cases become higher and the issues of statutory

15
See, e.g., Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 101 P.3d 140, 149 (Cal. 2004) (noting “in
the realm of attorney fees for private attorneys general, this court has markedly diverged from
United States Supreme Court precedent”); Lenaerts v. D.C. Dep’t of Employment Servs., 545
A.2d 1234, 1238 n.9 (D.C. 1988) (stating, in context of interpretation of workers’ compensation
statutes, that “it is said, with respect to borrowed statutes, that ‘only the decisions of the court
of last resort are normally adopted with the statute’ ” (citation omitted)).
16
Dahill v. Police Dep’t of Boston, 748 N.E.2d 956, 963 (Mass. 2001).
17
Chambers v. Trettco, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 910, 917-18 (Mich. 2000).
18
Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1540 (2005).
19
See Steven M. Berline & Jeanne R. Broderson, High Court Partially Shuts Door to N.Y.
Age-Discrimination Claims, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 8, 2005, at 4 (noting that prior to Smith, courts
subjected age discrimination suits under New York law to same analysis as claims brought
under ADEA, despite textual differences between laws, but that Smith is likely to have
“narrowing effect”).
20
Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 581 (2004).
21
Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 152 (2004).
22
See infra notes 90-119 and accompanying text.
23
See Ace Elec. Contractors v. IBEW, 414 F.3d 896, 900-01 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding
that, unlike ADEA, Minnesota’s Human Rights Act does not permit employers to favor older
workers on basis of age).
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interpretation become more complex, the potential for divergent
interpretations between state and federal antidiscrimination law
will only increase. Indeed, it is entirely possible that state courts
will increasingly heed the advice of Justice William J. Brennan, who
suggested that Supreme Court interpretations of the federal
Constitution should not necessarily be dispositive of questions
regarding individual rights under state constitutions, even where
the language of the two provisions is identical.24 Although this “new
judicial federalism” was originally championed in the context of state
constitutional interpretation, its basic theme—that state courts need
not follow the federal courts in lockstep on matters of construction
concerning the protection of individual rights—resonates with equal
strength in the context of employment discrimination law.
The Article also posits that, thus far, state courts have failed to
formulate a coherent theory for dealing with such situations.
Although state courts routinely adopt the federal courts’
constructions of parallel federal statutes for use in their own
antidiscrimination statutes, there is rarely much, if any, explanation
of why such a lockstep approach is appropriate. In light of the
increased potential for state courts to confront issues of
interpretation already addressed by the federal courts and the
increased potential for state and federal interpretations to come into
conflict, state courts need to develop a workable approach for dealing
with such matters. This Article attempts to provide such an
approach.
Part II of this Article discusses some possible reasons accounting
for the willingness of state courts to adopt the federal courts’
interpretations of parallel federal law with little independent
analysis.25 Part III briefly explains the new judicial federalism
movement, some of the criticisms it has engendered, and its
potential application to the interpretation of employment
discrimination statutes.26 Part IV examines some of the reasons
why, both as a practical and theoretical matter, state judges might
approach the task of statutory interpretation differently than their
24
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 495, 502 (1977).
25
See infra notes 30-47 and accompanying text.
26
See infra notes 48-70 and accompanying text.
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federal counterparts, and why the potential for divergent
interpretations of parallel state and federal employment law is
increasing.27 Finally, Part V proposes a substantive canon of
construction28 that would aid state judges in dealing with situations
where the potential for divergent interpretations exists.29 Under
this canon, there would be a general presumption in favor of uniform
construction between state and federal statutes that employ
identical or substantially similar language. As explained, this
presumption is justified on the grounds of preserving the
reputational integrity of both state courts and the United States
Supreme Court, promoting legislative efficiency, and fostering
deference to legislative intent.
II. STATE ANTIDISCRIMINATION STATUTES AND FACTORS
LEADING TO PARALLEL INTERPRETATIONS
Virtually all states have statutes prohibiting employment
discrimination in the private sector.30 Although numerous states
had employment discrimination statutes on the books prior to the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress’s decision to
outlaw discrimination in the workplace prompted more states to
enact similar statutes and to expand upon the protection afforded
Despite some substantive
under existing state statutes.31
differences, a considerable amount of federal-state redundancy has

27

See infra notes 71-199 and accompanying text.
“The phrase ‘substantive canons of construction’ is used to refer to content-based rules
of statutory interpretation, whose application is triggered by the content rather than the
linguistic form of the statute.” The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 459, 459 n.1 (2003); see also Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Making Laws Moral: A Defense of
Substantive Canons of Construction, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 915, 934 (2001) (stating that
substantive canons “establish policy rules and presumptions in interpreting statutes”).
29
See infra notes 200-449 and accompanying text.
30
See Long, supra note 11, at 628 (noting prevalence of state disability discrimination
statutes).
31
See Susan Elizabeth Powley, Exploring a Second Level of Parity: Suggestions for
Developing an Analytical Framework for Forum Selection in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 44 VAND. L. REV. 641, 667-68 (1991) (comparing employment discrimination
coverage under state and federal law); see also Julie M. Spanbauer, Kimel and Garrett:
Another Example of the Court Undervaluing Individual Sovereignty and Settled Expectations,
76 TEMP. L. REV. 787, 794-96 (2003) (discussing early attempts by states to address
employment discrimination).
28
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developed over the years regarding the interpretation of these
statutes. Some state antidiscrimination statutes specifically require
interpretation in conformity with parallel federal law.32 Even
though such forced consistency is the exception rather than the
norm, state courts have routinely adopted the federal courts’
interpretations of parallel federal law with little or no independent
analysis of the applicable state statute.33 In fact, state courts
sometimes appear to bend over backwards in construing state
antidiscrimination statutes in order to keep state and federal law on
the same track.34
Several factors help explain the general rule of this lockstep
approach to the interpretation of parallel state and federal
employment discrimination statutes.
First, protection from
discrimination in the workplace is a relatively recent phenomenon
and one driven largely by federal law. State attempts to address
employment discrimination were generally seen as failures at the
time of Title VII’s enactment in 1964.35 Although some states had
outlawed discrimination in the workplace prior to the enactment of
Title VII, few had previously outlawed sex discrimination, as Title
VII did, and it was not until Title VII became law that a majority of
states adopted their own antidiscrimination statutes.36 Moreover, it
was not until Title VII went into effect that courts and
commentators turned their attention to common law erosions of the
at-will employment rule in the states.37 Similarly, even though
many states prohibited discrimination against individuals with
disabilities prior to the enactment of the ADA in 1990,38 state laws
32

See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-5-27 (2004) (requiring Illinois Civil Rights Commission
to adopt rules not in conflict with employment discrimination provisions of ADA).
33
See, e.g., infra notes 222, 298, 389 and accompanying text (discussing state courts’
responses to several United States Supreme Court decisions concerning ADA).
34
See infra notes 217-221 and accompanying text.
35
See Herbert Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions: A
Critical Analysis with Recommendations, 14 BUFF. L. REV. 22, 23-24 (1964) (discussing failure
of state FEPC laws to improve employment status of racial minorities).
36
Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Use and
Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 91 (2002).
37
The law review article generally credited with triggering the re-examination of the
employment at-will rule was published in 1967. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will v.
Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
1404 (1967).
38
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
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were far from uniform and frequently provided less protection than
that ultimately provided by the ADA.39 In short, federal law has
traditionally set the standard for individual rights in the
employment context, with state legislatures and courts taking their
cues from federal law.
Second, a strong feeling exists among state judges that
consistency and uniformity of interpretation is, per se, a compelling
value.40 Aside from affording employers and employees with some
understanding of their relative rights and obligations prior to
dispute, uniform construction of parallel state and federal statutes
reduces forum shopping.41 Occasionally, announced rules of
statutory construction encourages this tendency toward
homogeneity.
The borrowed statute doctrine, for example,
establishes a presumption that a legislature that borrows statutory
language from another jurisdiction intended to adopt the judicial
interpretations of the highest court of the other jurisdiction.42 Thus,
where a state has borrowed the language of Title VII or the ADA for
use in its own employment discrimination statute, courts will
ordinarily presume that the state legislature intended to adopt the
construction afforded those statutes by the United States Supreme
Court prior to enactment by the state legislature.
Finally, where the Supreme Court has spoken or there is a
prevailing view among the federal courts, an institutional pressure
on a state court to interpret a state statute in a consistent manner

39
See Long, supra note 11, at 626-27 (discussing states’ varying definitions of “disability”
and obligations for employers prior to 1990).
40
See Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 389 A.2d 465, 478 (N.J. 1978) (“[W]here
[federal antidiscrimination standards] are useful and fair, it is in the best interests of everyone
concerned to have some uniformity in the law.”); Winn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 484 A.2d
392, 404 (Pa. 1984) (“[T]his Court has, in the interest of uniformity and predictability in
enforcement of equal employment legislation, construed the Human Relations Act in light of
principles of fair employment law which have emerged relative to the corresponding federal
statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”); W. Va. Univ. v. Decker, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265
(W. Va. 1994) (noting court had previously adopted formulation of disparate impact defense
under Title VII articulated by United States Supreme Court “simply because uniformity in
these matters is valuable per se”).
41
See Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 801 (Ky.
2004) (discussing reasons for Kentucky state court to construe law as consistent with federal
law).
42
Lenaerts v. D.C. Dep’t of Employment Servs., 545 A.2d 1234, 1238 n.9 (D.C. 1988)
(quoting Zerbe v. State, 583 P.2d 845, 846 (Alaska 1978)).
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undoubtedly exists. Divergent interpretations, particularly those in
the face of established Supreme Court precedent, may result in
reputational costs to the wayward state court, which may be seen as
engaging in results-oriented judging.43 Simply stated, a state judge,
despite having the inherent authority to construe a state statute in
a manner inconsistent with federal law, may hesitate to announce
to the world that a majority of the country’s highest court got the
issue wrong, either because the judge wants to avoid charges of
judicial activism or out of respect for the reputation of the Supreme
Court.44
Divergent interpretations may also result in other kinds of
institutional costs. Although state courts hear more cases overall
than federal courts45 and the number of state employment
discrimination cases has grown in recent years,46 these cases make
up a smaller portion of the state courts’ overall caseload than at the
federal level.47 Thus, given state judges’ relative lack of experience
in this area and their greater time constraints, it is understandable
that a state court would simply adopt the federal courts’ construction
of a parallel statute without engaging in any independent analysis.
III. THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM MOVEMENT AND ITS
PARALLELS TO THE INTERPRETATION OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION STATUTES

43

See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
See State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 815 (N.J. 1990) (O’Hern, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (discussing authoritative impact of U.S. Supreme Court, “guardian of our
liberties,” on state court decisions).
45
Judith S. Kaye, Things Judges Do: State Statutory Interpretation, 13 TOURO L. REV.
595, 599 (1997).
46
See John W. Parry, Executive Summary and Analysis, 18 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 614, 618 (1994) (noting shift by plaintiffs to state courts from traditionally
preferred federal forum); Powley, supra note 31, at 663 (noting “growing number of plaintiffs”
seeking redress in state courts).
47
According to one estimate, “[e]mployment discrimination cases now make up almost ten
percent of federal courts’ dockets.” Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for
Enforcing Employment Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401,
1424 (2004). Although comparable state court statistics are difficult to come by, employment
discrimination cases comprised only 1.4% of the civil cases disposed of by state courts in the
seventy-five largest counties in the U.S. in 2001. THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K. SMITH,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001,
at 1 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ctcvlc01.htm.
44
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A. THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM

The idea that state and federal law need not march in lockstep
first gained prominence in the field of constitutional law. During the
1970s, state courts more frequently interpreted their own
constitutions to provide greater protection for individual liberties
than similar provisions of the federal Constitution, primarily in
response to a perceived trend in the Supreme Court toward
decreased protection for individual rights.48 With words of
encouragement from Justice Brennan,49 proponents of this “new
judicial federalism” more frequently rejected the notion that the
United States Supreme Court had the final say in establishing a
floor of individual rights.
Proponents of the new judicial federalism offered numerous
arguments in support of this approach to state constitutional
interpretation. Some took the view that independent analysis of
state constitutions encouraged a dialogue between the federal and
state courts concerning the proper scope of individual rights.50
Others argued that independent analysis of state constitutions
better reflected the unique and shared values within an individual
state.51 For critics of the lockstep approach, state courts that refuse
to engage in independent analysis of state constitutional provisions
amount to “Pavlovian responses” to federal law.52 State judges who
engage in such an approach have relinquished the opportunity to
engage the federal courts in a meaningful dialogue and have ceded
the field of the protection of individual rights to the federal courts.53
48
James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power:
Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1031 (2003).
49
See Brennan, supra note 24, at 503 (noting “state courts can breathe new life into the
federal due process clause by interpreting their common law, statutes and constitutions to
guarantee a ‘property’ and ‘liberty’ that even the federal courts must protect”).
50
Goldfarb, supra note 36, at 90; see also Friedman, supra note 2, at 128-29 (advocating
federal and state court dialogue to further understanding of individual rights under federal
Constitution and to develop state constitutional law).
51
See Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA.
L. REV. 389, 391 (1998) (summarizing this position and stating that “[t]hose who believe that
states do constitute communities urge independent interpretation”).
52
Stone v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. of Parkersburg, 538 S.E.2d 389, 410 (W. Va. 2000) (McGraw,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing construction of state
antidiscrimination statute).
53
See Gardner, supra note 48, at 1060 (discussing independent state and federal analysis
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Given the long shadow cast by the Supreme Court and the Court’s
insistence that state courts clearly and expressly indicate that their
decisions are based on adequate and independent state grounds,54
state courts have generally felt compelled to base their alternative
constructions on differences between state and federal law, rather
than merely on the grounds that they disagree with the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of a parallel constitutional provision.55 In
making the decision to depart from federal authority, state courts
frequently rely upon the language of the provision in question,
historical context, case law development, the construction of similar
provisions in other state constitutions, and policy concerns.56
This tendency to justify departure from federal precedent on
supposed differences between state and federal sources has led to
perhaps the most common criticism of the new judicial federalism:
that it amounts simply to results-oriented judging57 and “a kind of
forum shopping for liberals.”58 In addition to broader, theoretical
criticisms, critics attack judicial federalism by arguing that in order
to justify a departure from federal precedent, state courts must
exaggerate differences and find uncertainty in federal law where
none exists.59 Although differences in state law may sometimes

of state constitutions).
54
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (noting that to avoid federal court
review of decisions, state courts not basing decisions on federal precedent should indicate
separate state grounds for decisions).
55
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991) (discussing U.S.
Supreme Court requirement that state courts make independent findings regarding state
grounds for their decisions). But see James A. Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate
Nationalism, and the Interpretation of State Constitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional
Argument, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1219, 1289 (1998) (“[A]s a coequal participant with federal courts
in the interpretation of a common constitutional heritage, a state court is entitled to part
company with the United States Supreme Court for no other reason than, in the state court’s
view, the Supreme Court has gotten it wrong.”). Professor Gardner has been one of the more
outspoken critics of the new judicial federalism. Schapiro, supra note 51, at 398.
56
See Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895 (discussing sources instrumental to court’s construction
of Pennsylvania constitution); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 873 (Vt. 1999) (discussing sources
used by Vermont Supreme Court to construe state’s constitution).
57
See Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: The Once ‘New Judicial Federalism’ and its Critics,
64 WASH. L. REV. 5, 6 (1989) (discussing underlying premises and claims held by critics of new
judicial federalism); Gardner, supra note 48, at 1063 (discussing state court’s departure from
federal reasoning merely to avoid outcome “dictated by federal law”).
58
Paula W. Kahn, State Constitutionalism and the Problems of Fairness, 30 VAL. U. L.
REV. 459, 464 (1995).
59
See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 48, at 1062-64 (noting examples).
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mandate a different interpretation of state constitutional law, critics
argue that departure from federal law is, as often as not, the result
of an illegitimate approach to judging.60
B. PARALLELS TO THE INTERPRETATION OF STATE EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION STATUTES

There are several parallels between the approach of state courts
regarding the interpretation of state constitutions and state
employment discrimination statutes. First and most obviously, both
deal with the concepts of equality and individual rights.61
Constitutional law discussions permeate numerous Supreme Court
decisions involving Title VII, including the legality of voluntary
affirmative action programs62 and disparate impact.63 The converse
is true as well, with the basic McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework of Title VII finding its way into the law concerning
peremptory challenges.64
Second, there is clear similarity between the patterns of state
court involvement in both constitutional and antidiscrimination
issues. In the constitutional context, it was only natural that state
constitutional law remained relatively dormant during the 1960s as
constitutional rights were being expanded by the United States
Supreme Court.65 It was not until this trend began to reverse in the
1970s that state courts fully stepped into the breach. Employment
discrimination law has followed a similar path. Early Title VII

60

Id. at 1059-60.
While many state decisions that have departed from federal constitutional law have
involved the criminal law area, a significant number of decisions have involved the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses. See James N.G. Cauthen, Expanding Rights Under
State Constitutions: A Quantitative Appraisal, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1183, 1187 (2000) (citing
studies concerning state constitutional due process and equal protection challenges).
62
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979).
63
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976) (finding disparate impact without
discriminatory intent not in violation of Equal Protection Clause).
64
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-94 (1986) (remanding criminal defendant’s
equal protection claim based on racial discrimination in jury selection using McDonnell
Douglas framework).
65
Brennan, supra note 24, at 495.
61

2006]

DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS

15

judicial decisions were generally seen as pro-plaintiff until a string
of Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s reversed the trend.66
Finally, the functional similarity of state court approaches to
interpretations of parallel constitutional and statutory provisions is
striking. With state antidiscrimination statutes, a few state courts
simply take a lockstep approach and follow the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of federal antidiscrimination law whenever
practicable.67 As with constitutional interpretation, most state
courts start with the assumption that federal law provides the
correct standard for its state law counterpart.68 Only where a court
“can identify some objective factor of text, history, precedent or state
values to justify the divergence” will it reach a different result.69
Finally, a few states take what would be called a “primacy” approach
in the context of constitutional interpretation, whereby the state
looks first to its own law and to federal law only for guidance.70
IV. THE POTENTIAL FOR A NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
Although divergent interpretations of parallel state
antidiscrimination statutes have not yet developed into a fully
formed “movement” with doctrinal underpinnings comparable to the
new judicial federalism, a number of factors are nudging state courts
to interpret their own antidiscrimination statutes independently of
federal law.
A. MORE CASES

One likely predictor for a rise in the number of divergent state
and federal interpretations of antidiscrimination law is the sheer

66

See Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and
Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 895 (2004) (asserting that
“McDonnell Douglas, in the pre-Hicks era, was decidedly pro-plaintiff”).
67
See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
68
Gardner, supra note 48, at 1061 (describing interstitial approach to state constitutional
interpretation).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 1055.
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number of employment discrimination lawsuits in the judicial
system.
After a relatively slow beginning, the number of
employment discrimination cases filed in federal courts exploded
between the years 1970 and 1989.71 This trend continued relatively
unabated into the 1990s.72 As the amount of case law at the federal
level grew, so too did the amount of potentially bad case law for
plaintiffs. Although any number of reasons explain why an
employment discrimination plaintiff might prefer a state court over
a federal court,73 in the federal courts employment discrimination
plaintiffs, like plaintiffs in the constitutional context, could logically
be expected to seek alternative forums in the state courts and
alternative remedies under state antidiscrimination statutes, given
the potential obstacles in the federal courts.74
By choosing to rely on state law and filing in state court, several
possibilities for more favorable outcomes might open up to plaintiffs.
It is possible, for example, that the language of the state statute may
differ in some meaningful—and potentially beneficial—way from
federal law.75 By relying on state law, the particularly fortunate
plaintiff may discover that the state statute contains a statement of
purpose that is arguably broader than federal law76 or language
specifically directing reviewing courts to interpret the provisions of
the statute liberally,77 thus providing a statutory hook for a state
court on which to hang its hat when departing from federal
precedent. Even where the language of the two statutes is identical

71
Michael H. Leroy & Peter Feuille, Judicial Enforcement of Predispute Arbitration
Agreements: Back to the Future, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 249, 290-91 n.215 (2003).
72
See id. (indicating continued increase in cases filed).
73
See, e.g., Powley, supra note 31, at 670 (noting that “because some state statutes offer
broader coverage . . . [and] superior remedies . . . plaintiffs may find these statutes attractive
supplements or potential alternatives to federal law”).
74
See Janet Bond Arterton, Employment Discrimination Claims in State Court: A
Laboratory for Experimentation, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 499, 499 (1985) (suggesting
in 1985 that in light of restrictive Supreme Court interpretations of federal employment
discrimination law, “the utilization of state courts as substantive alternatives for vindicating
employees’ unjustified discharges represents the new, and perhaps the only, opportunity for
creative expansion of discrimination claims”).
75
See infra notes 221-224 and accompanying text.
76
See Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Prods., Inc., 601 P.2d 584, 585 (Alaska 1979) (finding that
state statute was intended to be more broadly construed than federal law).
77
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 9 (West 2004) (“This chapter shall be
construed liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes . . . .”).
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or substantially the same, the institutional pressures pushing a
state court toward uniformity are largely absent if a plaintiff files a
complaint in state court before a majority of federal courts have
staked out a position on the issue or before the Supreme Court has
definitively resolved the issue.
Of course, it is far more likely that a state court will consider
federal precedent and adopt a parallel construction of state law.78 In
some cases, however, the plaintiff basing a discrimination claim on
state law simply has little to lose. As state courts gain more
experience with employment discrimination cases, they can draw
from a greater reservoir of state precedent. And as this reservoir
expands, so does the potential for conflict with federal law. In short,
the sheer number of issues arising under state and federal
antidiscrimination statutes creates an incentive for plaintiffs to
sometimes bypass federal law, thus creating the potential for
divergent interpretations of state and federal employment
discrimination statutes.
B. MORE COMPLEX CASES

As the number of employment discrimination cases has increased,
the field of employment discrimination law has itself become
exceedingly complex.79 This complexity carries with it the potential
for disagreements in interpretation. It should not be surprising,
therefore, to see more state courts called upon to enter the confusion.
1. Poorly Drafted Statutes. To be blunt, one cause of the current
climate of uncertainty regarding federal employment discrimination
law is congressional failure to make its intent clear with respect to
some portions of Title VII.80 For example, in 1991, Congress
responded to a series of controversial decisions by the Supreme
Court concerning the disparate impact theory of liability under Title

78
The same is true of state constitutional interpretation, even after the rise of the new
judicial federalism. See G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1097, 1116-17 (1997) (discussing tendency, in spite of new judicial federalism,
for lockstep interpretations of parallel statutes in state courts).
79
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
80
See Spiropoulos, supra note 9, at 1520 (asserting that “Congress may have shirked its
duty . . . [to] articulate clear legal rules in its statute”).

18

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:

VII by amending the Act.81 By 1989, the Supreme Court had
established an employer-friendly standard of the business necessity
defense in disparate impact claims in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio.82 With the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress announced
that one of its purposes was “to codify the concepts of ‘business
necessity’ and ‘job related’ enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. . . . and in the other Supreme Court
decisions prior to Wards Cove.”83 The problem is that neither Griggs
nor the other decisions prior to Wards Cove are completely clear on
what that standard is.84 Congress somewhat careless use of
language in this instance has led to disagreement among the federal
courts concerning the appropriate standard.85 Not surprisingly, this
disagreement has materialized at the state court level as well.86
2. Statutory Law, Common Law Rulemaking. Another factor that
explains some of the complexity surrounding modern employment
discrimination law is the fact that many interpretational issues now
require courts to stray from the textual language and legislative
history into the realm of more explicit judicial rulemaking. For
example, the statutory text of Title VII provides precious little
guidance to a court considering the circumstances under which an
employer may be held vicariously liable for sexual harassment
committed by a supervisor.87 Indeed, the statute does not even use
the term “sexual harassment,” let alone describe the two traditional
types of sexual harassment, quid pro quo and hostile work

81
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
82
490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989).
83
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991).
84
Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 497-99 (3d Cir. 1999) (Weis, J.,
dissenting).
85
See Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 95 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The Act’s
ambiguous language . . . has allowed a number of contradictory standards to emerge.”).
86
Compare Albaugh v. City of Columbus, 725 N.E.2d 719, 724 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999)
(stating that employer-friendly Wards Cove standard applies to disparate impact claims
brought under Ohio’s antidiscrimination statute), with Novack v. Nw. Airlines, 525 N.W.2d
592, 597-98 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that Minnesota’s statute employs both employerfriendly Wards Cove standard and less employer-friendly pre-Wards Cove standard), and
Crocker v. Pielch, No. CIV.A. PC 2000-1771, 2002 WL 1035424, at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 9,
2002) (stating that Rhode Island’s statute, which defines “business necessity” to mean
“essential to effective job performance” is stricter than federal standard).
87
See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998) (addressing this question).
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environment.88 Instead, a court confronting this issue must resort
to common law agency principles and guess which standard of
liability would best further Congress’s purpose in prohibiting
discrimination “because of sex.”89 This results in a form of statutory
interpretation that resembles common law rulemaking and
constitutional interpretation more than traditional statutory
interpretation.
Perhaps the clearest example of this more complicated form of
statutory interpretation is the ongoing battle over the future
viability of the time-honored McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework used throughout employment discrimination cases. As
originally devised by the Supreme Court, a plaintiff claiming
intentional discrimination first had to make out a prima facie case
by proving the following: (1) membership in a protected class; 2) the
plaintiff applied for and was qualified for the job at issue; 3) the
plaintiff was rejected for the job in question; and 4) the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons with the same qualifications as the plaintiff.90 At that point,
the burden shifted to the defendant to rebut the presumption of
intentional discrimination arising from the establishment of the
prima facie case by producing evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the plaintiff.91 Once the
employer satisfied this burden, the burden shifted back to the
plaintiff to prove that the employer’s reason was merely a pretext for
discrimination.92 Although simple on its face, this three-part
approach contained numerous areas for potential disagreement.
Was the employer’s burden on the second stage a burden of proof, or
was it one merely of production?93 If, as the Supreme Court
ultimately decided, the employer’s burden was a burden of
production,94 did an employee automatically avoid summary

88
See id. at 752 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and noting that these terms first
appeared in academic literature before being adopted by courts).
89
Id. at 754-55, 764-65.
90
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-06 (1973).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (finding employer
has burden of production rather than persuasion in second part of McDonnell Douglas test).
94
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
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judgment simply by establishing that the employer’s reasons were
pretextual (the “pretext only” standard), was the employee required
to put forth some additional evidence of discrimination (the “pretext
plus” standard), or was a showing of pretext sometimes, but not
always, sufficient to avoid summary judgment?95
Reasonable arguments existed on each side of these issues, and
the literal text of Title VII in no way mandated the Court’s ultimate
resolution of them. At each stage of the original test’s refinement,
federal courts grappled with the subtleties of a procedural test that
was largely untethered to any statutory language and that could,
depending upon how those subtleties were resolved, make things
much easier or much harder for plaintiffs to hold their employers
liable for intentional discrimination.96 Not surprisingly, federal
courts split on the issues prior to their ultimate resolution by the
Court.97 Given the great importance courts attach to consistency in
procedural matters,98 most state courts fell into line with the
Supreme Court’s ultimate resolution of these issues.99 In the
interim, however, there were similar splits among the states.100
95
See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (holding that
employee’s prima facie case and fact finder’s disbelief of employer’s reason were sufficient to
prevent summary judgment for employer).
96
See Smith v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 197, 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)
(stating that lower courts were left to determine proper standard for proving pretext in
McDonnell Douglas framework).
97
Id. at 200-01 (noting that federal and state courts were largely left to their own devices
prior to Hicks and that three different interpretations of McDonnell Douglas test emerged).
98
See Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A
Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 311-18 (2001) (arguing notion of uniformity is so
pervasive that state statutes straying from uniform rules in form will be held to conform in
practice).
99
See, e.g., Smith, 2 S.W.3d at 202 (recognizing “[t]he degree to which this expanding body
of federal law has now subsumed state law”).
100
Compare Town v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 568 N.W.2d 64, 69 (Mich. 1997) (adopting
prevailing contemporary view among federal circuits that plaintiff’s showing of pretext may
create jury question as to intentional discrimination, but does not necessarily require this
result), with Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Boston, Inc., 646 N.E.2d 111, 117 (Mass.
1995) (holding that “once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case and further shows either
that the employer’s articulated reasons are a pretext or by direct evidence that the actual
motivation was discrimination, the plaintiff is entitled to recovery” (emphasis added)), and
Columbus Paper & Chem., Inc. v. Chamberlain, 687 So. 2d 1143, 1149, 1152 (Miss. 1996)
(citing federal “pretext plus” authority and interpreting Hicks to mean that “plaintiff had to
show ‘pretext’ and that [an impermissible characteristic] was the basis for the employer’s
termination” (emphasis added)). Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s final resolution of the
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Even where the text of Title VII did provide some guidance as to
the procedural framework governing intentional discrimination
claims, the federal courts may have completely misunderstood that
guidance for twelve years. Historically, the McDonnell Douglas
framework only applied where the plaintiff lacked direct evidence of
discrimination.101 Under this approach, the inquiry focused on the
employer’s “true” reason for its decision.102 In contrast, the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework did not apply where
the plaintiff had some type of “smoking gun” evidence of
discriminatory intent and the employer nonetheless argued that it
would have made the same adverse decision even absent the
impermissible consideration of a particular characteristic. Instead,
the “mixed motives” framework developed in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins applied.103 Thus, two analytically distinct frameworks
existed in the world of employment discrimination law, with the
appropriate framework dependent upon whether a plaintiff had
direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination.104
As part of the 1991 amendments to Title VII, Congress created
section 2000e-2(m), which provides that “an unlawful employment

great “pretext only” versus “pretext plus” debate in Reeves, a few state courts retreated from
their prior employee-friendly “pretext only” standards and fell into line with the federal
standard announced in Reeves. Compare Blare, 646 N.E.2d at 117 (using “pretext only”
standard), with Abramiam v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 731 N.E.2d 1075, 1085
(Mass. 2000) (stating court never intended its decision in Blare to compel verdict for plaintiff
who proves pretext); compare United Planning Org. v. D.C. Com’n on Human Rights, 530 A.2d
674, 680 (D.C. 1987) (citing pre-Hicks authority to find that “[Supreme Court precedent] makes
it absolutely clear that a plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination and who discredits the defendants’ rebuttal should prevail, even if he or she has
offered no direct evidence of discrimination”), with Hollins v. Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass’n, 760
A.2d 563, 571 (D.C. 2000) (“[I]t is not enough for the employee simply to show that the
employer’s proffered reason for the employment action is pretextual . . . .”). Even after Hicks
settled the dispute at the federal level, at least one state refused to follow federal precedent,
reasoning that its state evidentiary code was dramatically different than federal rules of
evidence. Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225, 228-29 (N.D. 1995).
101
See William R. Corbett, Casenote, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in
Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 204 (2003) (explaining that “cases involving direct
evidence were analyzed under mixed-motives, and cases involving circumstantial evidence
were analyzed under the [McConnell Douglas] framework”).
102
See Davis, supra note 66, at 859-60 (stating McDonnell Douglas framework is based on
notion that “either the discriminatory reason or nondiscriminatory reason—but not
both—motivated the adverse employment action”).
103
490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989) (plurality opinion); Corbett, supra note 101, at 204.
104
Corbett, supra note 101, at 204.
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practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates
that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice.”105 On its face, section 2000e2(m) would seem to apply to both single-motive/indirect evidence
cases and mixed-motives/direct evidence cases and to create a
“universal causation standard.”106 Nevertheless, many courts clung
to the prior distinction, believing that the amendment merely
overruled Justice O’Connor’s view in Price Waterhouse that a
plaintiff must establish discriminatory intent under a “substantial
factor” test.107 These courts believed that the distinction between
single-motive and mixed-motives cases was left untouched by the
addition of section 2000e-2(m).108 Thus, the prevailing rule remained
that a plaintiff needed direct evidence of discrimination in order to
be entitled to a mixed-motives jury instruction.
The Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa
cast this approach into doubt.109 Relying on the plain language of
section 2000e-2(m), the Court held that a plaintiff does not need to
produce direct evidence of discrimination to be entitled to a mixedmotives jury instruction.110 Regardless of the type of evidence relied
upon, a plaintiff must simply establish that a protected
characteristic played a motivating factor in the decision.111 With the
primary basis for the McDonnell Douglas/Price Waterhouse
distinction—the existence or lack of direct evidence—now
obliterated, federal courts were left to wonder what, if anything,
remained of McDonnell Douglas.112

105

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000) (emphasis added).
Davis, supra note 66, at 890, 893-94.
107
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
108
See, e.g., Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 218-19 (3d Cir. 2000)
(preserving distinction between mixed-motives and pretext cases).
109
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
110
Id. at 101-02.
111
Id.
112
See, e.g., Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding
that “Desert Palace had no impact on prior Eighth Circuit summary judgment decisions”);
Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers of Iowa, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1196 (N.D. Iowa 2003)
(arguing that third stage of McDonnell Douglas analysis must be modified); Dare v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991-93 (D. Minn. 2003) (holding that Desert Palace applies
to both single-motive and mixed-motives cases and that courts need not follow McDonnell
Douglas framework).
106
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To be sure, commentators have repeatedly criticized the
distinction between single-motive and mixed-motives cases as
creating a “false dichotomy”113 and failing to reflect the realities of
employer decisionmaking.114 Nonetheless, the dichotomy persisted
at the federal level and remained the norm for a dozen years. What
is perhaps most interesting about Costa is that it took nearly a dozen
years from the enactment of section 2000e-2(m) for the federal courts
to attempt to fit the section’s language within the broader
framework of McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse. As the
Supreme Court explained in Costa, if Congress had meant for section
2000e-2(m) to apply only when direct evidence of discrimination
existed, it could have made that intent clear by including language
to that effect.115 Yet, the federal courts somehow allowed themselves
to be convinced for the better part of twelve years that the judgemade direct/indirect evidence Price Waterhouse distinction largely
remained good law. Having “worshipped at the monument of
McDonnell Douglas” for so long, federal judges had difficulty
accepting that Congress had effectively altered that monument.116
If Costa truly is the cataclysmic event some have described,117 the
decision will have ripple effects beyond the federal court system.
Like their federal counterparts, state judges, who had traditionally
fallen into lockstep with the Supreme Court regarding McDonnell
Douglas, are now struggling with the implications of the decision.118
113

Dunbar, 285 F. Supp. 2d at 1196.
See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 101, at 214-15 (noting search for single motive “seldom if
ever reflects reality, as employers rarely make employment decisions for one reason”).
115
Costa, 539 U.S. at 99.
116
Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort” Redux: Section 703(M), Costa, McDonnell
Douglas, and the Title VII Revolution—A Reply, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 427, 444 (2004).
117
See id. at 427 (noting “demise of McDonnell Douglas” after Costa); Corbett, supra note
101, at 199 (“It would be hard to find an opinion of the United States Supreme Court that said
less but changed an area of the law more dramatically.”).
118
See Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 717, 729 n.11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(noting that Costa “raises the possibility—some would say ‘hope’—that the ‘mixed motive’
approach may displace all but the first stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework,” but that
both parties agreed McDonnell Douglas framework applied); Plagmann v. Square D Co., No.
03-0465, 2004 WL 2809521, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2004) (declining to address whether
Costa modified analysis of state law claims because plaintiff failed to preserve issue for appeal,
but noting that this failure “may not matter” because, inter alia, Iowa’s statute differs from
Title VII); Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgmt. of the Trial Ct. v. Mass. Comm’n Against
Discrimination, 791 N.E.2d 316, 322 (Mass. 2003) (implying that Costa is not inconsistent with
Massachusetts law in that neither requires the impermissible factor to be sole factor in
114
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And if the state courts’ response to the initial evolution of the
McDonnell Douglas test is any indication,119 the short-term future is
uncertain. Indeed, given the controversial nature of the theoretical
underpinnings for the McDonnell Douglas/Price Waterhouse
distinction, it is likely that at least some state courts will reject
whatever federal standard ultimately emerges.
3. More Complex Statutes. A third reason to believe that
divergent interpretations of parallel state and federal
antidiscrimination law will increase is that the new generation of
employment discrimination statutes, such as the ADA, are
themselves textually and theoretically more complex. Like much of
the federal Constitution, Title VII’s basic prohibition against
intentional discrimination is laden with ambiguity.120 At least,
however, it is short. In contrast, with the ADA,121 one must sift
through numerous terms, each having its own specialized meaning,
before ever getting to the basic issue of when an employer has
discriminated against an individual with a disability. As a result,
the relative density of the ADA’s language has resulted in a
staggering number of interpretational issues.
To assess an ADA claim, one must first determine whether an
individual has a disability. The ADA contains three separate, but
related, definitions of the term, each containing potential
ambiguities.122 Once this determination is made in a plaintiff’s
favor, the plaintiff must still be “qualified” in order to claim
protection under the ADA.123 This, in turn, requires a court to
consider the meaning of two more potentially ambiguous concepts:
(1) whether the individual is capable, with or without reasonable

adverse decision and continuing to apply McDonnell Douglas framework in indirect evidence
case); Sniecinski v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 666 N.W.2d 186, 192-93 (Mich. 2003)
(reaffirming, after Costa was decided, that mixed-motives cases under Michigan’s
antidiscrimination statute must be established through direct evidence).
119
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
120
See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex?: The Causation Problem in
Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1708 (2002) (noting courts’ differing
conceptions of meaning of “because of sex” in Title VII).
121
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
122
Under the Act, an individual with a disability is one who (a) has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, (b) has a record of such
impairment, or (c) is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
123
Id. § 12112(a).
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accommodation, of performing (2) the essential functions of the
particular job the individual holds or desires.124 While the statute
provides some guidance as to the meaning of the term “essential
functions,” it does nothing more than provide a non-exhaustive list
of possible reasonable accommodations.125
Assuming the plaintiff makes it this far, the judge’s task may not
be over; the employer may argue that it is excused from providing a
reasonable accommodation because it would impose an “undue
hardship”—a term that the statute defines only as “significant
difficulty or expense.”126 Only upon resolution of these issues can the
court proceed to the McDonnell Douglas portion of the claim—a
portion which may no longer exist after Costa.127 Thus, the sheer
number of potentially ambiguous terms within the ADA has created
the potential for divergent interpretations among federal and state
courts.
C. MORE CONTROVERSIAL CASES

At its core, employment discrimination law is all about
attempting to strike the appropriate balance between employer
autonomy and individual rights. Many issues regarding the
workplace directly implicate much broader economic, psychological,
and philosophical issues.
Accordingly, issues of statutory
construction often require courts to make difficult policy decisions,
thus increasing the odds of conflicting decisions.
The ADA provides perhaps the best example. Because the ADA
takes a different approach to the problem of discrimination than
older antidiscrimination statutes, the potential for divergent
interpretations under the ADA’s ambiguous language is increased.
Whereas Title VII requires employers to treat their similarlysituated employees similarly, the ADA requires employers to treat
By mandating
individuals with disabilities differently.128
124

Id. § 12111(8).
Id. § 12111(9).
126
Id. § 12111(10).
127
See supra notes 112-118 and accompanying text.
128
See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002) (“By definition any special
‘accommodation’ requires the employer to treat an employee with a disability differently, i.e.,
preferentially.”); Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and
125
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“reasonable accommodation,”129 the ADA requires employers to
modify existing policies and practices so that individuals with
disabilities can perform the essential functions of their positions.
This naturally means that, employers are required to provide
“preferential” treatment for such individuals, provided such
treatment is “reasonable” and does not impose an undue hardship on
the employer.130 Therefore, the ADA cuts into the discretion of
employers to run their workplaces as they see fit perhaps more than
other antidiscrimination statutes.
Accordingly, judicial
interpretation of the ADA’s definition of a qualified individual with
a disability will likely have a substantial effect on the balance
between employer autonomy and individual rights.
At the same time, the reasonable accommodation requirement
raises the specter that the ADA provides “special rights” for
individuals with disabilities, rather than providing equality of
Not surprisingly, some commentators have
opportunity.131
suggested that the courts have interpreted the ADA’s terms more
strictly than Congress intended.132 For example, given the vague
nature of the reasonable accommodation requirement and the
potential effect a broad interpretation of that requirement might
have on employers and nondisabled employees, a court might be
expected to establish a high threshold for qualification as disabled
in order to reduce the number of instances in which the reasonable
accommodation is implicated.133 Defining the terms “substantially
limits” and “major life activities” narrowly allows a court to avoid
difficult choices about the scope of the ADA’s restriction on

Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 10-11 (1996) (“Reasonable accommodation . . .
requires employers to treat some individuals—those disabled persons who would be qualified
if the employer modified the job to enable them to perform it—differently.”).
129
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(a) (2000).
130
US Airways, 535 U.S. at 397.
131
See Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 50 (2000) (noting that “rather than viewing ADA cases as
disputes about fundamental civil rights, many judges treat them as requests for special
benefits made by employees who are performing poorly”).
132
See id. at 21 (noting text of ADA does not mandate Court’s narrow interpretation of
statute).
133
Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can
Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C.
L. REV. 307, 320-21 (2001).
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employers’ discretion to establish workplace rules and policies.
Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that the Supreme Court’s
decisions to date have interpreted the definition of disability
narrowly.134
Although many state antidiscrimination statutes employ almost
identical definitions of disability,135 several state statutes define the
term in slightly different language136 or not at all.137 Based on the
perceived need for consistency of substantive definitions and
concerns over reputational costs, state judges may be inclined to
either finesse the textual differences where they exist or simply
borrow the federal definition to fill in the gap in state law. Indeed,
some state courts have done exactly that.138 The ADA is not an
ordinary statute, however. The Supreme Court’s restrictive reading
of the ADA’s terms has provoked a large outcry from academics and
the original sponsors of the measure in Congress.139 These critics
contend that the Court has effectively thwarted Congress’s purpose
in enacting the ADA.140 In short, many now perceive the ADA as
having largely failed in its mission of improving employment
prospects for individuals with disabilities.141 Thus, the policy aspects
inherent in any interpretation of statutory language are more
pronounced in the context of disability discrimination statutes,
increasing the potential for divergent interpretations.142
Furthermore, decisions regarding the balance between employer
autonomy and individual rights are more likely to capture the
134

Long, supra note 11, at 599.
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-3-101(3) (2004) (using federal definition).
136
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(8) (2004) (defining individual with disability as one
with physical or mental impairment that makes achievement unusually difficult or limits
capacity to work, record of such impairment, or being perceived as having such impairment).
137
See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-101(a) (2004) (lacking definition of “disability”).
138
See, e.g., Kitten v. State Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 644 N.W.2d 649, 661 (Wis. 2002)
(stating that definition of disability found in ADA is virtually identical despite textual
differences).
139
See Tony Coelho, Our Right to Work, Our Demand to be Heard: People with Disabilities,
the 2004 Election, and Beyond, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 729, 734 (2004) (explaining that,
through its decisions on ADA, the Supreme Court “wrote me out of my own bill”).
140
Id.
141
See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (2004)
(stating ADA has failed to achieve significant improvements in employment for individuals
with disabilities).
142
See infra notes 253-267, 363-418 and accompanying text (discussing such
interpretations).
135
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attention of judges and legislators than many other issues. Based
on past congressional practice,143 federal judges are well aware that
a decision perceived as tipping the balance too far in one direction
may produce a congressional response. Even where judicial
interpretation of an antidiscrimination statute has not yet provoked
the ire of a legislature, the balance between employer autonomy and
individual rights may be so precarious that seemingly minor shifts
in one direction or the other may be enough to cause substantial
uncertainty among the affected parties.
In this charged environment, it is not surprising that federal
decisions sometimes produce a response not only from Congress, but
from state legislators and courts. In direct response to the Supreme
Court’s interpretations of the ADA’s definition of disability, at least
two state legislatures have amended their employment
discrimination statutes to provide for more expansive coverage.144
Before Congress could overrule the Supreme Court’s holding that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not discrimination
because of sex,145 the appellate courts of several states quickly
announced that, regardless of how the Supreme Court interpreted
Title VII, pregnancy discrimination amounted to sex discrimination
under those states’ antidiscrimination statutes.146 Even prior to
Costa, at least one state court rejected the distinction between
indirect and direct evidence cases on the grounds that the federal
tests failed to adequately protect individuals from discrimination.147
Another established a more plaintiff-friendly standard regarding
pretext than ultimately emerged at the federal level.148 And
although all the above responses created greater protection for
individual plaintiffs, state legislatures and courts occasionally
respond to federal precedent increasing employee protection by

143

See supra notes 83, 105 and accompanying text.
See Long, supra note 11, at 634-37 (detailing amendment of definition of “disability” in
California and Rhode Island statutes).
145
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Cailburt, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976).
146
See Mass. Elec. Co. v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 375 N.E.2d 1192, 1200
(Mass. 1978) (listing state decisions).
147
See Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 625-27 (Minn. 1988)
(applying broader state test over federal test).
148
See Joyal v. Hasbro, Inc., 380 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) (describing plaintiff-friendly
Massachusetts law in Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 751 N.E.2d 360, 366 (2001)).
144
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bringing previously more expansive state law back into line with
federal law or by interpreting parallel state statutes more
narrowly.149
D. DIFFERING APPROACHES TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AMONG
STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES

One final predictor of future divergent interpretations of parallel
state antidiscrimination statutes—and one that might explain some
of the existing diversity—is the possibility that state judges simply
approach the task of statutory interpretation differently from their
federal counterparts.150 A state judge might approach statutory
interpretation in a different manner from a federal judge for any
number of reasons that have nothing to do with institutional
differences between state and federal courts. Differences in
approaches to statutory interpretation are at least as likely to result
from different judicial sensibilities between two judges as from the
fact that one judge sits on a state bench and the other a federal
bench.151 Nonetheless, a number of differences between state and
federal courts, both mechanical and theoretical, may logically result
in at least some differences in approaches.
1. Mechanical Reasons. To varying degrees, federal courts rely
on the text of the statute, legislative history, administrative rules
and interpretations, and general canons of statutory construction.
Although state judges will theoretically always begin with the
statutory text and may resort to canons of construction in construing
149
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(3) (2004) (containing post-ADA definition of disability
that does not include ADA’s “record of” or “regarded as” prongs); Muller v. Hotsy Corp., 917
F. Supp. 1389, 1414 n.10 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (noting Iowa Supreme Court has articulated
standard, specifically rejected by Congress in adopting ADA, for reasonable accommodations
under state disability discrimination statute imposing lower burden on employers than does
ADA); see also Kathy A. Bullerdick, Missouri Commission Changes Sexual Harassment Rules,
MO. EMP. L. LETTER, Aug. 2001 (noting that Missouri Commission on Human Rights amended
its rules regarding vicarious liability to bring them more into line with federal law).
150
See Kaye, supra note 1, at 20 (arguing that state courts’ interpretations are more rooted
than federal courts’ in common law principles).
151
See ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 3-4 (1997) (noting that different interpretative approaches are
not usually product of different jurisdictions); Eric Lane, How to Read a Statute in New York:
A Response to Judge Kaye and Some More, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 85, 87-88 (1999) (supporting
view that interpretation cannot be divided into state and federal approaches).
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a statute, their ability or willingness to rely on legislative history or
administrative rules and interpretations may differ from their
federal counterparts, based on the peculiarities of the jurisdiction.
Unlike state constitutional history,152 there is a general lack of
statutory legislative history at the state level.153 Although state
courts may look at the timing of statutory enactments and their
amendments in order to gain insight into a legislature’s purpose, few
states publish transcripts of legislative debates or committee
reports.154 Therefore, as an institutional matter, state courts are
generally less able to rely on the type of legislative history that is
frequently used at the federal level to resolve issues of statutory
construction. This reality forces state judges to look elsewhere in
their quest to provide meaning to the text in question. In some
instances, this may result in increased reliance on federal authority.
Where the statutory text is ambiguous, state courts may be inclined
to adopt the federal courts’ interpretation of a parallel statute on the
assumption that consistency for consistency’s sake is a good thing.
In other instances, however, a departure from federal precedent may
be justified by slight differences in statutory text or adherence to the
principle of stare decisis.155
State and federal courts may also differ in their ability or
willingness to defer to administrative interpretations of statutory
text. Although many states have human rights agencies with the
power to promulgate rules concerning antidiscrimination measures,
there is considerable diversity among the states regarding the extent
to which these agencies actually exercise that authority. Some state
human rights commissions have published in-depth rules and
interpretations, whereas others have produced little, if anything.
The paucity of legislative history and administrative guidance
within a particular state might prompt a state court to rely more

152
See Robert F. Williams, Old Constitutions and New Issues: National Lessons from
Vermont’s State Constitutional Case on Marriage of Same-Sex Couples, 43 B.C. L. REV. 73, 86
(2001) (noting that state constitutional history has been integral to development of new
judicial federalism due to greater availability of such history in state, as compared to federal,
government).
153
See Kaye, supra note 1, at 30 (noting that legislative history is sparsely recorded in New
York, which likely applies to other states).
154
See Kaye, supra note 45, at 600 (noting “much less” legislative history at state level).
155
See infra notes 438-449 and accompanying text.
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heavily on federal interpretations of statutory language. In contrast,
where there is greater administrative activity, there is greater
potential for an administrative agency to adopt a rule contrary to an
established federal rule.156
State courts may also differ from federal courts regarding the
amount of deference they extend to agency interpretations. For
example, the federal courts have sometimes refused to extend
Chevron deference157 to some of the EEOC’s pronouncements
concerning the various antidiscrimination statutes, either because
the EEOC lacked substantive rulemaking power158 or because the
pronouncements were in the form of interpretive guidance, rather
than legislative in nature.159 In some instances, however, a state
court’s view of the state’s human rights commission may be more
friendly than the federal courts’ general perception of the EEOC,160
or the state human rights commission may have greater rulemaking
authority than the EEOC.161 In such cases, an agency interpretation
may more heavily influence a state court’s resolution of a statutory
interpretational issue than at the federal level.
2. Theoretical Reasons. Another factor possibly supporting the
conclusion that state judges approach the task of statutory
interpretation differently from their federal counterparts is the
reality that there is a closer relationship between the judiciary and
other branches at the state level.162 In the words of one state judge,

156
See MD. CODE REGS. 14.03.02.03(B) (2003) (stating, in opposition to federal law, that
determination of individual’s substantial limitation in major life activity should be made
without regard to mitigating effects of remedial devices or appliances).
157
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (requiring
courts to follow any “permissible” agency construction of statute where Congress has not
precisely addressed relevant issue).
158
See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976) (noting Congress did not
grant EEOC “authority to promulgate rules or regulations pursuant to [Title VII]”).
159
See EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that language in
interpretive guidance, not being part of regulations, is not entitled to Chevron deference).
160
Compare Rebecca Hanner White, Deference and Disability Discrimination, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 532, 533 (2000) (“The EEOC, however, has historically been given short shrift by litigants
and by the judiciary.”), with Dahill v. Police Dept. of Boston, 748 N.E.2d 956, 961 (Mass. 2001)
(adopting interpretation of state disability discrimination contained in Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination guidelines and stating that such guidelines were “entitled
to substantial deference”).
161
See, e.g., Pollock v. Wetterau Food Dist. Group, 11 S.W.3d 754, 767 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)
(noting broader authority granted to Missouri Commission on Human Rights).
162
See Christine M. Durham, The Judicial Branch in State Government: Parables of Law,
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“[t]he governing principle” at the state level “is not separation but
networking.”163 Unlike their federal counterparts, state judges
routinely perform a variety of functions traditionally associated with
the executive branch, such as administering family court mediation
programs and domestic violence programs.164 There are also
numerous opportunities for state courts to interact with the
legislature. The rulemaking power enjoyed by state courts provides
a greater opportunity for dialogue with the legislature on policy
matters than exists at the federal level,165 as does the power to issue
advisory opinions enjoyed by some state courts.166 Although both
state and federal courts are sensitive to legislative budget
constraints, the legislature in many states has “ultimate control over
how the courts spend their money.”167 This greater control over
judicial purse strings may provide opportunities for state
legislatures to punish courts for controversial decisions168 and make
state judges more sensitive to the threat of such reprisals.169
As a result of this greater interaction, a dialogue between the
branches concerning judicial decisions is more likely to exist at the
state level. Although federal decisions may sometimes provoke a
response from Congress, the nature of the legislative process insures
that direct rebukes of judicial decisions usually occur only where
Congress views a series of decisions as having swung the pendulum
too far to one side or where an individual decision is highly

Politics, And Power, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1601, 1608 (2001) (noting interbranch relations at state
level do not mirror those at federal level); Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal
Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1543, 1560-61 (1997)
(discussing different approaches to separation of powers taken by states).
163
Peters, supra note 162, at 1561.
164
See Durham, supra note 162, at 1609-11 (describing judicial interaction with executive
and legislative branches at state level).
165
Id.; see also Peters, supra note 162, at 1561 (addressing judicial participation in state
legislative process).
166
See Peters, supra note 162, at 1560-61 (noting that though most do not, some state
courts may issue advisory opinions on pending legislation).
167
Durham, supra note 162, at 1612.
168
See id. at 1612-13 (detailing skirmish between California legislatures and California
courts).
169
See State ex rel. Rist v. Underwood, 524 S.E.2d 179, 195, 198 (W. Va. 1999) (Maynard,
J., dissenting) (expressing concern that by “thumb[ing] its nose” at legislature, court had
invited legislature to take adverse action with respect to judicial salaries, adequate funding
of court staff and equipment, and judicial tenure).

2006]

DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS

33

controversial.170 In contrast, state legislatures and judiciaries more
routinely engage in an open dialogue.171 As a practical matter, this
may be true partly because the local nature of state government
increases the opportunity for formal and informal interactions
among members of the three branches.172 Also, because a state
legislature need only monitor the work of one or two courts, as
opposed to the “blizzard of opinions emanating from the federal
courts,” it is more likely that a state legislature will be aware of and
able to respond to the decisions of state courts.173 Given this reality,
state courts may be better situated than federal courts to put
legislators on notice of perceived flaws or inequities in statutory
language and invite revision.174
Also, the state courts’ history of common law rulemaking ensures
a greater dialogue than exists at the federal level. Legislatures
frequently codify or reject pre-existing common law rules developed
by courts and engage in continuous refinement of those rules with
Thus, state judges may approach statutory
the courts.175
interpretation with a higher expectation that the legislature will
step in and “correct” judicial interpretation of a statute.176
Differences in selection and retention of judges may also result in
different approaches to statutory interpretation. The overwhelming

170
See supra notes 81-145 and accompanying text (discussing Civil Rights Act
Amendments of 1991 and Pregnancy Discrimination Act); see also Johnson v. Transp. Agency,
480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987) (noting idea of dialogue between legislature and courts regarding
correctness of judicial interpretation of statute); Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes,
Shall We Dance?: Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 1045, 1055 (1991):
Legislative action will probably occur when the decision has received
media attention, when one or more legislators or legislative committees
become interested in the subject, when there is near unanimity that the
court decision is wrong, when a powerful interest group or governmental
agency is affected by the decision and seeks legislative relief, or when the
decision arouses passionate response among various constituencies.
171
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and
Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 48 n.214 (1998).
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Indeed, in some states, judges are required by law to make “constructive suggestions
they may deem necessary for the improvement of the administration of justice” outside the
context of judicial opinions. Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 170, at 1072.
175
Kaye, supra note 45, at 601-02.
176
Kaye, supra note 1, at 23.
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majority of state judges are elected to office or retained in office by
popular vote.177 Most do not enjoy life tenure.178 In some respects,
one might expect this reality to produce less rather than more
uniformity between state and federal law. One might think that
judicial elections encourage strategic voting among judges in
controversial cases so as to minimize electoral risks.179 As decisions
departing from federal precedent are more likely to be controversial
than decisions in conformity with federal precedent, one would
naturally expect a judge subject to election to seek to minimize risk.
Depending upon the salience of the issue to be decided or the time
to a judge’s re-election,180 however, the risks associated with
departing from federal precedent may be minimal.
The different nature of judicial selection at the state level may
also lead some judges to view themselves as having a different role
to play because they are elected. As is arguably the case with
constitutional interpretation, state judges may be more inclined to
view their state’s selection and retention methods as conferring a
“democratic imprimatur” that allows a freer hand in policy
making.181 Elected judges may be more willing to acknowledge that
judging involves lawmaking and that lawmaking involves policy
choices.182 In short, because they know their policy choices are
subject to review by the electorate, some state judges may feel less
constrained about making explicit policy choices than their federal
counterparts.183
This greater willingness to speak the language of public policy
may also be explained in large measure by the fact that, as an
institutional matter, state courts are in the business of shaping the

177

Id.
Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 976 (2001).
179
Owen G. Abbe & Paul S. Herrnson, How Judicial Election Campaigns Have Changed,
85 JUDICATURE 286, 295 (2002).
180
Powley, supra note 31, at 666.
181
Burt Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20
RUTGERS L.J. 881, 899 (1989).
182
See Hans A. Linde, Observations of a State Court Judge, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS:
TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 117, 117 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (“The active
participation of state judges in the policy process is much more taken for granted and much
less controversial than the involvement of federal judges in the national government.”).
183
Durham, supra note 162, at 1606.
178
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common law.184 On a mechanical level, the backdrop of the common
law may influence a state judge’s approach to the task of statutory
interpretation.185 Numerous canons of construction, such as those
stating that statutes in derivation of the common law should be
construed narrowly186 and that courts should follow common law
usage where a legislature has employed words with settled common
law traditions,187 have developed to help judges find a balance
between common law and statutory rules. But the common law
functions of state judges may influence decisions in other, less
mechanical ways. As “the keepers of the common law,”188 state
judges, in the words of Judge Judith S. Kaye of the New York Court
of Appeals, “regularly, openly, and legitimately speak the language
of the common law whereas federal courts do not.”189 According to
Judge Kaye, the essence of the common law is lawmaking and
policymaking by judges.190 As such, the task of developing the
common law routinely requires state judges to weigh changing and
competing social interests while deciding a particular case or
controversy.191
To Judge Kaye, statutory interpretation is not terribly different.
Although the principle of stare decisis places some limits on the
ability of judges to make decisions based purely on policy
considerations, the language of a statute likewise restricts a judge’s
ability to substitute his or her own policy views for those of the
legislature.192 However, regardless of whether a court is dealing
with common law or a statute, there will inevitably be ambiguities
and gaps that simply cannot be filled by reference to the statutory
text or extrinsic sources that might shed light on the legislature’s

184

See Kaye, supra note 1, at 6 (stating that “state courts—not federal courts—are the
keepers of the common law”).
185
Peters, supra note 162, at 1556.
186
Id.
187
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992).
188
Kaye, supra note 1, at 6.
189
Id. at 20. But see Michael J. Mazza, A New Look at an Old Debate: Life Tenure and the
Article III Judge, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 131, 160 (2003-04) (“[M]ore and more decisions from the
federal courts have the look, taste, smell, and feel of common law.”).
190
Kaye, supra note 1, at 5.
191
See id. (noting that common law as body of rules not only resolves conflicts at hand but
also guides future conduct).
192
Id. at 5-6, 26.
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intent.193 Although there is nothing revolutionary about such a
view,194 Kaye argues that this approach is particularly appropriate
for state judges, who likely will not have the same extrinsic sources
upon which to rely in divining the legislature’s intent.195 Also
implicit in Judge Kaye’s argument is the notion that state judges are
particularly well suited to make such decisions. According to Kaye,
“When the meaning of a statute is in dispute, there remains at the
core the same common-law process of discerning and applying the
purpose of the law.”196 Because state judges are “schooled in the
common law”197 and hence less tied to formalist notions of judging
than their federal counterparts, state judges may consider
themselves more adept at discerning the purpose of a statute and
more accustomed to basing their decisions on policy grounds than
their federal counterparts.198
Even where a state judge is not so predisposed, as a matter of
mechanics, state judges are more likely than federal judges to be
forced to reconcile common law decisions with statutory text, thus
influencing the ultimate construction of a statute. Employment
discrimination statutes were enacted against the backdrop of the
common law employment at-will rule. Even prior to the enactment
of state and federal employment discrimination statutes, state courts
relied on relevant common law tort and agency principles to
determine under what circumstances an employer may be held liable
for the wrongs of its employees. The Supreme Court’s recent
decisions defining “employer,” “employee,” and vicarious liability in
the context of Title VII and the ADEA relied heavily on common law
principles.199 These decisions make clear that common law
principles will continue to play an important role in the evolution of
federal antidiscrimination law. Given the potential for conflict
193

Id. at 10, 29.
See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO.
L.J. 281, 285-86 (1989) (discussing necessity for judges to resolve issues even where statute
or legislative intent provides inadequate guidance).
195
Kaye, supra note 1, at 29-30.
196
Id. at 25.
197
Id. at 34.
198
See John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1662-63 (2001) (stating that state judges’ common law powers
historically made it natural to view statutes as starting point for further analysis).
199
See supra notes 10, 89 and accompanying text.
194
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between these federal decisions and pre-existing state court
decisions on similar topics, state courts will likely be called upon
more frequently to decide whether to depart from stare decisis and
bring state law back into line with federal law.
V. OF PAVLOVIAN RESPONSES AND DIVERGENT
INTERPRETATIONS
Given the increasing potential for divergent interpretations of
parallel antidiscrimination statutes, state courts need to develop a
coherent approach to situations where this possibility arises. At
present, many state courts routinely adopt the settled constructions
of parallel federal statutes with little or no explanation of their
reasons for doing so.200 To the extent these courts ever explain why
federal decisions are persuasive to the point of being close to de facto
mandatory authority, the explanations usually fall into one of two
categories.
First, some simply suggest that consistency for consistency’s sake
is a good thing.201 When courts elaborate on this concept, they
sometimes cite the evils that may flow from divergent state and
federal interpretations, such as forum shopping.202 In other areas of
law, such as cases under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),
uniformity is said to be justified on the grounds that increased
certainty of legal results reduces the costs of litigating over
uncertain or ambiguous legal issues.203 Unlike the UCC, however,
Title VII expresses no desire to promote uniformity of the law.204 In
fact, Congress clearly expressed a willingness to permit and even
encourage experimentation by the states by disavowing any intent
to occupy the field of employment discrimination law.205 Thus,
200

See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
202
See, e.g., Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 80102 (Ky. 2004) (listing discouraging forum shopping as one benefit of lockstep interpretation).
203
Daniel A. Gecker & Kevin R. Huennekens, Waiving Goodbye to the UCC: A Proposal
to Restrict the Continuing Erosion of Rights Under an Imperfect Code, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 175,
175 (1994).
204
See U.C.C. § 1-102(3)(c) (1999) (“Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are . . . to
make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.”).
205
42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (2000); see Powley, supra note 31, at 667 (“Congress designed Title
VII to supplement, rather than replace, State laws.”).
201
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unlike uniform laws, where the express goal of uniformity might
imbue another jurisdiction’s interpretation with some inherent
indicia of persuasiveness, nothing within the language of Title VII
or other federal employment discrimination statutes expressly
applies pressure on state courts to adopt federal interpretations.206
Indeed, many state employment discrimination statutes differ
markedly from federal law regarding matters such as jurisdictional
thresholds and available remedies that naturally encourage the very
evils a presumption in favor of parallel construction seeks to avoid.207
The other most common explanation for the commonality of
interpretations is that state law closely resembles or was based on
pre-existing federal law.208 Here, state courts rarely attempt to
explain why the fact that a state legislature modeled an
antidiscrimination statute after federal law or used similar language
should lead to an identical construction of ambiguous language.
Although the borrowed statute rule lends itself to parallel
construction by a state court where federal decisional law predates
enactment of the state statute, the rule does not encourage judges to
follow subsequent decisional law from the federal courts.209
Despite the state courts’ general failure to articulate the reasons
behind the presumption in favor of parallel construction in the
employment discrimination context, there are convincing arguments
for interpreting parallel law uniformly, in addition to the practical
concerns of forum shopping and uncertain results. As explained in
the following sections, uniform interpretation in the employment
discrimination field is more likely to further the preference of the
enacting or current state legislature while promoting legislative
efficiency. Generally, uniform construction should be preferred
when possible because it is less likely to subject state judges to

206
See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Olsen, 692 S.W.2d 850, 853 (Tenn. 1985) (“This court should
strive to maintain the standardization of construction of uniform acts to carry out the
legislative intent of uniformity.”).
207
Powley, supra note 31, at 667-68.
208
See, e.g., Chang v. Inst. for Public-Private P’ships, Inc., 846 A.2d 318, 324 (D.C. 2004)
(noting state law definition of disability closely resembles that of ADA).
209
Cf. Crosby v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found., 276 So. 2d 661, 665 (Miss. 1973) (finding that
Mississippi’s adoption of Georgia statute did not bind court to follow subsequent
interpretations of Georgia courts).
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charges of results-oriented judging and to call into question
unnecessarily the wisdom or moral authority of the Supreme Court.
State courts should adopt a substantive canon of construction for
situations in which they must interpret state law in the shadow of
parallel federal law. A state court should feel free to engage the
state legislature and the federal courts in a dialogue concerning the
individual rights embodied in the statutes where there are
meaningful differences in terms of statutory text, legislative history,
or agency interpretations; where no consensus exists at the federal
level regarding the interpretation of a parallel federal statute; or
where, in those rare cases, it can be said in good faith that the
federal courts’ interpretation of a parallel statute is plainly wrong.
In other cases, however, state courts should defer to the federal
courts’ interpretation of the parallel statute. Adoption of this
substantive canon would increase predictability in the resolution of
such issues. Perhaps more importantly, adopting this canon is the
best means of promoting legislative intent, fostering legislative
efficiency, and preserving the reputational integrity of the Supreme
Court and state courts.210
A. THE CASE FOR INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS

One of the primary criticisms of the lockstep approach to state
constitutional interpretation is that it prevents any meaningful
dialogue between the states and the federal government regarding
the concept of individual rights.211 For proponents of judicial
federalism, this failure to examine state law critically is particularly
troubling given the courts’ role as guardians of individual rights.212

210
In this respect, the justifications offered in this Article are similar to those typically
offered for the avoidance canon of construction. Under this canon, courts should “ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question [of the statute’s
constitutionality] may be avoided.” Child Pornography—Statutory Interpretation, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 279, 285 (1995) (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936)
(Braindeis, J., concurring)). The canon is typically explained as an attempt to protect the
credibility of courts, avoid absurd results, promote legislative efficiency, and facilitate judicial
deference to legislative intent. Id.
211
Friedman, supra note 2, at 133-34; Gardner, supra note 2, at 792-93.
212
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 550-51 (1986) (noting
importance of broad state court interpretation of state constitution to development of
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In arriving at the conclusion that the protections afforded by a state
constitution are identical to those afforded by the federal
Constitution, state courts adopting the lockstep approach have
sometimes ignored textual differences that might support a contrary
conclusion.213 In doing so, they subject themselves to the criticism
that they have abdicated their judicial responsibility.214 In the
following section, I argue that in some situations, these same
concerns are present when a state court uncritically accepts federal
law as establishing the standard for protection from employment
discrimination.
1. Where Meaningful Differences Exist Between State and Federal
Law. One of the chief criticisms of the new judicial federalism
focuses on the willingness of state courts to exaggerate the
differences between state and federal constitutions in order to justify
a departure from federal precedent.215 However, where meaningful
distinctions between state and federal law exist, it represents an
abdication of the judicial function for a court to fall into lockstep
with federal authority with little or no independent examination of
the distinctions. By giving effect to such meaningful distinctions,
state courts may also preserve the states’ role as “laboratories for
innovation and experiment.”216
a. ADA Examples: Limitations vs. Substantial Limitations. A
fairly egregious example of state judges’ tendency to be blinded by
federal law existed in California for several years regarding the
state’s disability discrimination statute. In 1992 (two years after the
ADA’s passage), the California legislature amended California’s Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).217 Rather than defining

individual rights).
213
See Ruth V. McGregor, Recent Developments in Arizona State Constitutional Law, 35
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 265, 268-69 (2003) (implying state court historically rationalized and evaded
differences in language of state and federal statute to promote lockstep approach); Jim Rossi,
Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in
the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1220 (1999) (stating lockstep approach in state courts may
ignore clear evidence of disparities in state and federal constitutions).
214
Schapiro, supra note 51, at 422-23; Brennan, supra note 212, at 552.
215
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
216
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
217
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (West 2004); see also Michael L. Murphy, Assembly Bill 2222:
California Pushes and Breaks the Disability Law Envelope, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 495, 505-07
(2002) (describing history of FEHA).
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disabilities in terms of substantial limitations, the FEHA simply
spoke of limitations of major life activities.218 As numerous federal
courts had concluded that Congress’s inclusion of the word
“substantially” worked to limit dramatically the scope of the ADA’s
definition,219 this difference should have been significant. Despite
the obvious textual difference, several California courts required
plaintiffs to establish substantial limitations of major life activities,
sometimes expressly relying on the ADA for support.220 Ultimately,
the California legislature stepped in with an amendment that
restated the obvious in no uncertain terms: notwithstanding any
inconsistent interpretation, the legislature intended state law to
require a limitation rather than a substantial limitation.221 Given
the clear differences between the FEHA and the ADA, the only
plausible explanations for the prior inconsistent interpretations are
that (a) the courts so clearly viewed federal law as establishing the
norm that only an explicit command from the legislature would
justify a divergent interpretation, or (b) the courts simply viewed
federal law as striking the more appropriate balance, and in the
absence of an explicit command from the legislature, they would
interpret the statute in a manner consistent with this policy choice.
b. ADA Examples: Mitigating Measures. A number of states
have also fallen into lockstep with the Supreme Court’s holding in
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. that an individual’s use of mitigating
measures (such as corrective lenses, medication, etc.) must be taken
into account when assessing whether the individual is substantially
limited in a major life activity under the ADA’s definition of
disability.222 According to the Court, the plain language of the ADA

218

Colmenares v. Braemer Country Club, 63 P.3d 220, 223 (Cal. 2003) (citing 1992 Cal.
Stat. 4308, amending § 12926(k)).
219
See infra notes 280-281 and accompanying text.
220
See Colmenares, 63 P.3d at 226 n.6 (listing with disapproval state cases applying federal
test to FEHA claims).
221
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926.1(d) (West 2004).
222
Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999); see Grant v. May Dep’t Stores
Co., 786 A.2d 580, 584-85 (D.C. 2001) (finding nurse who controlled diabetes with insulin not
disabled under Sutton test); Seaman Unified Sch. Dist. No. 345 v. Kansas Comm’n on Human
Rights, 990 P.2d 155, 158 (Kan. 1999) (applying Sutton to find diabetic employee not disabled);
Kuechle v. Life’s Companion P.C.A., Inc., 653 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)
(approving trial court analysis accessing agoraphobic nurse’s disability status under Sutton);
Davis v. Computer Maint. Serv., Inc., No. 01A01-9809-CV00459, 1999 WL 767597, at *9 (Tenn.
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definition requires that a plaintiff’s use of mitigating measures be
considered when assessing whether the plaintiff’s impairment
substantially limited a major life activity.223 As the Court noted, the
statute uses the present indicative verb form in the phrase
“substantially limits.”224 Therefore, the Court reasoned, the plain
language of the statute mandates that a plaintiff’s impairment must
presently substantially limit a major life activity.225 Conditions that
“ ‘might,’ ‘could,’ or ‘would’ be substantially limiting if mitigating
measures were not taken” do not presently substantially limit a
major life activity.226
In addition, the Court concluded that the overall text of the Act
supported this construction. The legislative Findings and Purposes
contained within the text of the Act itself suggested to the Court that
Congress “did not intend to bring under the statute’s protection all
those whose uncorrected conditions amount to disabilities.”227 The
Findings and Purposes indicate that forty-three million Americans
have disabilities.228 “Had Congress intended to include all persons
with corrected physical limitations among those covered by the Act,”
the Court concluded, “it undoubtedly would have cited a much
higher number of disabled persons in the findings.”229 Finally, in her
concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg found it telling that the
Findings and Purposes referenced individuals with disabilities as
being a “discrete and insular minority [who have been] subjected to
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a
position of political powerlessness in our society.”230 People with

Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1999) (affirming summary judgment for employer under Sutton analysis of
diabetic employee’s claim).
223
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
Id. Further, the Court reasoned that the ADA definition of disability speaks to the
effect that an impairment has on an individual. Id. at 483. If a court were to “make a
disability determination based on general information about how an uncorrected impairment
usually affects individuals, rather than on the individual’s actual condition,” the court would
not be engaging in the type of individualized inquiry that the statute mandates. Id.
227
Id. at 484.
228
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2000).
229
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487.
230
See id. at 494 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)).
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correctable disabilities, Justice Ginsburg believed, simply did not fit
within that class.231
The Sutton decision generated an outpouring of criticism. Critics
questioned how the Court could conclude that the statutory language
had a plain meaning in light of the fact that a clear majority of the
federal appellate courts had reached a contrary conclusion.232
Particularly galling to some critics was the Court’s use of the Act’s
Findings and Purposes to reach its conclusion.233 The Court itself
noted that, although Congress concluded that forty-three million
Americans had disabilities, no one was completely sure where that
number had come from.234 Moreover, both the legislative history and
the sources supposedly accounting for the estimate assumed that at
least some people with correctable conditions would be considered as
having disabilities under the ADA. Thus, the Court’s conclusion
excludes a group of people that helped make up the forty-three
million count.235
Another criticism was that by concluding that “disability” had a
plain meaning, the Court avoided reference to the ADA’s legislative
history, which seemed to indicate that Congress intended for the
determination of whether an individual is substantially limited to be
made without regard to the availability of mitigating measures.236
The Court’s decision not to defer to the EEOC’s interpretation of the
ADA’s definition of disability also drew fire.237 Prior to Sutton, the
EEOC took the view that “[t]he determination of whether an
231

Id.
Id. at 495-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that eight federal courts had held statute
defines “disability” without regard to mitigating measures).
233
See, e.g., id. at 511 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing unreliability of 43 million figure
provided by Congress).
234
Id. at 484. The Supreme Court cited several possible sources for the figure, none of
which contained an estimate of 43 million. Id. at 485. These sources actually employed
definitions of disability different than those used in the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. Lisa
Eichhorn, Applying the ADA to Mitigating Measures Cases: A Choice of Statutory Evils, 31
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1071, 1113 (1999).
235
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 512 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236
White, supra note 160, at 560; see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 52 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334 (“Whether a person has a disability should be assessed without
regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or
auxiliary aids.”); Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 35 GA. L. REV. 27, 84 (2000) (finding court “guilty” of ignoring ADA’s legislative history).
237
See White, supra note 160, at 538 (describing Court’s refusal to defer to EEOC
interpretation as “troubling”).
232
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individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be
made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures
such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices.”238 At the time
of the decision, most federal courts had deferred to the EEOC’s
position on the matter.239 Aside from the fact that the Court felt the
definition had a plain meaning, the Court pointed out that while
Congress had empowered the EEOC to issue regulations enforcing
the employment provisions of Title I of the ADA, the statutory
definition of “disability” fell outside Title I and was instead
contained within the generally applicable provisions of the ADA.240
Therefore, the Court was unwilling to defer to the EEOC’s
interpretation of the statute on the question of mitigating
measures.241
The criticism of Sutton has continued in the ensuing years. For
example, Bonnie Poitras Tucker has argued that in promulgating
the “mitigating measures” rule, the Sutton Court “seem[ed] more
concerned with requiring people with disabilities to . . . take all
possible steps to change or rehabilitate themselves than with
enforcing the ADA’s goal of preventing discrimination based on
irrational stereotypes, prejudice or benevolent paternalism.”242
Others have noted the practical Catch-22 that the rule creates for
some plaintiffs.243 Under the Sutton rule, an individual who takes
medication or uses mitigating devices to offset the effects of an
impairment may not be disabled enough to qualify as having a
disability.244 If the individual does not employ such mitigating
measures, however, the effects of an individual’s impairment may be
severe enough that the individual is no longer capable of performing

238
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 52 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334.
239
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 495-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
240
See id. at 478-79 (discussing three agencies with authority to regulate Act).
241
See id. at 483-84 (noting EEOC guidelines approach runs “counter to the individualized
inquiry approach mandated by the ADA,” and could lead to “anomalous result”).
242
Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court’s Definition of Disability Under the ADA:
A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321, 349 (2001).
243
Mark A. Rothstein et al., Using Established Medical Criteria to Define Disability: A
Proposal to Amend the Americans with Disabilities Act, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 254 n.72 (2002).
244
Id. at 254-55.
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the essential functions of the position, thus rendering the individual
unqualified.245
Despite the criticism, there is an undeniable logic to the Sutton
Court’s reading of the ADA.246 The Court’s conclusion that the
ADA’s definition of disability has a plain meaning may represent a
broad understanding of the term “plain meaning,” but it is likely the
most reasonable and natural reading of the statute’s actual
language.247 Although the Court’s use of the forty-three million
estimate is somewhat suspect, the estimate is a part of the statute
itself and does provide at least some clue as to whom Congress
thought it was protecting in enacting the statute. Finally, one does
not have to be a devout textualist to find persuasive Justice
Ginsburg’s point about the congressional finding that individuals
with disabilities comprise a “discrete and insular minority.”
Regarding the Court’s avoidance of the ADA’s legislative history,
some have questioned whether the legislative history is as clear as
is often claimed.248 For example, prior to Sutton, the Fifth Circuit
had concluded that nothing within the ADA’s legislative history
compelled the conclusion that “all impairments must be considered
in their unmitigated states and no mitigating measures may ever be
taken into account.”249 Indeed, perhaps the biggest obstacle that the
petitioners in Sutton faced was the nature of their impairments.
Both petitioners were severely myopic, but with corrective lenses
their vision was 20/20.250 Despite the passages in the legislative
history, which primarily concern impairments of a fairly serious
nature, it is difficult to believe that Congress intended the ADA’s
definition of disability to cover fairly common impairments that
could be corrected through the use of something as simple and
inexpensive as eyeglasses. In other words, if a court asked itself how
245

Id. at 254 n.72.
See Charles B. Craver, The Judicial Disabling of the Employment Discrimination
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 18 LAB. LAW. 417, 438 (2003) (supporting
majority’s decision in Sutton).
247
See, e.g., Washington v. HCA Health Servs., 152 F.3d 464, 469 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated,
527 U.S. 1032 (1999) (noting that opinions advocating taking mitigating measures into account
offer “most reasonable reading” of ADA).
248
See id. at 468 (noting inconsistencies in congressional reports); McGowan, supra note
236, at 85 (discussing terms not clearly defined in legislative history).
249
Washington, 152 F.3d at 470.
250
Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999).
246
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Congress would have dealt with the facts of Sutton,251 it is difficult
to accept the proposition that Congress would have concluded that
the Sutton petitioners had a disability. Had the Court reached the
opposite conclusion, employers potentially would have been
responsible for providing costly and disruptive reasonable
accommodations for individuals with easily correctable impairments.
In sum, Sutton presented a classic question of statutory
interpretation in which perfectly reasonable arguments can be
mustered to support either conclusion on the mitigating measures
rule.252 Unfortunately for state courts who must interpret their own
states’ disability discrimination statutes, this only makes the task
more difficult.
As discussed in the next section, the fact that a federal law is
controversial or that a contrary interpretation of a parallel statute
is defensible or might represent a better policy choice in the eyes of
a state judge is not a sufficiently strong justification to depart from
federal law. However, by conducting an independent analysis of a
parallel state statute, a court may find that there are, in fact,
differences that do not simply provide a fig leaf for the departure
from federal level, but actually strongly support such a departure.
In 2001, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court confronted the
question of whether Sutton’s mitigating measures rule applied to
Massachusetts’s antidiscrimination statute in the case of a hearingimpaired police officer who used hearing aids to mitigate the effects
of his hearing impairment.253 Even though Massachusetts’s
statutory definition of “handicap” was identical to the ADA’s
definition of “disability,” the court held in Dahill v. Police
Department of Boston that the statute did not require consideration
of mitigating or corrective measures in assessing whether an
individual’s impairment substantially limited the individual in a
major life activity.254

251
See United States v. Klinger, 199 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1952) (suggesting this approach
to statutory interpretation).
252
See White, supra note 160, at 586 (stating that “how best to resolve the mitigating
measures puzzle was an issue on which reasonable people could disagree”).
253
Dahill v. Police Dep’t of Boston, 748 N.E.2d 956, 958 (Mass. 2001).
254
Id.
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In reaching this result, the court conducted an independent
analysis of Massachusetts’s antidiscrimination statute and
concluded that several factors justified a different interpretation
from that of the ADA in Sutton.255 Unlike the Supreme Court, the
Dahill court concluded that the text was not clear as to whether the
use of mitigating measures must be taken into account in assessing
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.256
Nor did the legislative history of Massachusetts’s statute compel the
conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in Sutton. According to
the court, when the Massachusetts legislature amended the statute
in 1983, it explicitly patterned the definition of “handicap” after the
definition in the Rehabilitation Act.257 The court assumed that the
legislature intended the statute to be interpreted consistently with
then-existing Rehabilitation Act case law.258 Because no federal
court had expressly decided the mitigating measures question by
that point, the legislative history did not compel a particular
conclusion on the question.259
Left with ambiguous text and ambiguous legislative history, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that several
differences between the Massachusetts statute and the ADA
justified a departure from the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Sutton.
First, after Sutton, the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination (MCAD) concluded that the determination of
whether an individual has a handicap should not take into account
an individual’s use of corrective or mitigating measures.260 Although

255

Id.
Id. at 960.
257
Id.
258
Id. at 960-61.
259
Id.
260
See id. at 961, 963. The MCAD actually stated that mitigating measures should not be
taken into account when assessing whether an individual has an impairment. Id. at 961.
Arguably, that is not the same thing as stating that such measures should not be taken into
account when assessing whether an individual has an impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity. The MCAD, however, seems to have intended to establish a standard
whereby an individual’s use of mitigating measures should not be taken into account when
determining whether the individual has a “handicap.” The MCAD’s guidelines provide that
“an employee with a serious mental illness that affects her ability to work in a broad range of
jobs may be considered ‘handicapped,’ even if the symptoms of the mental illness can be
mitigated or eliminated by medication.” Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination,
Guidelines: Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Handicap, http://www.state.ma.us/
256
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the EEOC’s similar conclusion had been rejected, the Massachusetts
court saw an important distinction. Whereas Congress had not
conferred upon the EEOC the authority to interpret and implement
the ADA’s general definition of disability, the MCAD did have such
authority under the Massachusetts statute.261 Thus, the MCAD’s
interpretation was entitled to “substantial deference.”262
In addition, the Massachusetts statute specifically directs courts
to construe the statute liberally in order to accomplish its
purposes.263 Thus, unlike the presumption of strict interpretation
mandated by the Supreme Court in the ADA context,264
interpretation of Massachusetts’s statute proceeds from the
assumption of a more liberal construction. “Surely,” the court
reasoned, “one aspect of that remedial purpose is to encourage
impaired persons to overcome or mitigate their disabilities.”265
Considered as a whole, Dahill is not a situation (as is often
alleged with the new judicial federalism movement) in which a state
court simply disagrees with a Supreme Court decision and inflates
minor differences between state and federal law into full-blown
distinctions in order to justify its preferred result.
The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court may have, and indeed
probably did, disagree with the Sutton court’s policy choice.
Nevertheless, the textual differences and historic deference to
agency interpretations in Massachusetts not only support, but point
strongly in favor of an interpretation of Massachusetts law contrary
to that offered by the Supreme Court regarding the ADA.266 Other

mcad/disability1.html#one (last visited Sept. 26, 2005). Thus, the MCAD appears to have
made a conscious decision to reject the mitigating measures rule announced in Sutton. See
MCAD Rejects Supreme Court’s Recent Definition of Disability, http://www.shpclaw.com/
updates/mcad.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2005) (noting MCAD’s rejection of narrower United
States Supreme Court interpretation of “disability” under ADA).
261
Dahill, 748 N.E.2d at 963.
262
Id. at 961. Given the Massachusetts courts’ history of deference to the judgments of the
MCAD, see, e.g., Beaupre v. Cliff Smith Assocs., 738 N.E.2d 753, 764 (Mass. Ct. App. 2000),
the court’s deference in this instance was largely consistent with past practice.
263
Dahill, 748 N.E.2d at 962 (citing MASS. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 4 (West 2004)).
264
See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
265
Dahill, 748 N.E.2d at 962.
266
At least one of the differences the Dahill court viewed as “critical” does not hold up
under close scrutiny. Unlike the ADA, the Massachusetts statute did not contain any estimate
of the number of individuals with disabilities. Id. at 963. As discussed previously, the Sutton
majority found it important that Congress estimated the number of Americans with
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state courts may find similar differences supporting such a result if
and when they conduct their own independent analysis of state
law.267
2. Ongoing Debates at the Federal Level. On issues where no
uniform federal standard regarding a question of individual rights
has emerged, there is a benefit in permitting debate to flourish.
Obviously, debate among the lower courts and other political actors
may sharpen and focus the legal arguments pertaining to a
particular issue. But by allowing the debate among the lower courts
to percolate, the Supreme Court also allows more central questions
regarding the basis for the right asserted to be more thoroughly
fleshed out. This “percolation” policy of the Supreme Court
specifically contemplates states partaking in the debate.268
States initially helped shape the debate over equality in the
workplace by acting before Congress to outlaw various forms of
discrimination in the private sector.269 Since that time, the dialogue
has more closely resembled that of a monologue, with Congress and
the federal courts doing most of the talking. But when the federal
and state governments are both reading from essentially the same
text and uncertainty exists in the courts as to the meaning of that
text, the potential for dialogue concerning the meaning of that text

disabilities to be 43 million; according to the majority, that number surely would have been
higher had Congress intended to cover individuals who employed corrective or mitigating
measures. See supra notes 228-229 and accompanying text. Because Massachusetts’s statute
contained no such estimate, the Dahill court found Sutton’s reasoning to be of little use.
Dahill, 748 N.E.2d at 963-64. The fact that the Massachusetts legislature did not estimate the
number of Massachusetts citizens with disabilities is hardly surprising because (1) the statute
was modeled after the Rehabilitation Act, which itself only estimated that “millions of
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities,” and (2) no other state legislature
has seen fit to provide in its statute a more exact estimate of the number of citizens with
disabilities. If the Massachusetts legislature had provided such an estimate when it amended
the statute in 1980, that estimate would have been groundbreaking when it was announced
and hopelessly outdated by the time of the Dahill opinion. In addition, as noted, Congress’s
estimate that there were 43 million Americans with disabilities was largely created out of
whole cloth to begin with. See supra notes 227-235. Thus, it is somewhat peculiar that a court
would find the absence of such an estimate to have any particular significance.
267
See MD. CODE REGS. 14.03.02.03(B) (2003) (stating, contrary to federal law, that
determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in major life activity should
be made without regard to mitigating effects of remedial device or appliance).
268
Ronald Dworkin, Rawls and the Law, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1387, 1401 (2004).
269
See Long, supra note 11, at 626; supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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exists.270 Thus, where no uniform position on fundamental questions
of equality has emerged in the federal courts, it would be the height
of pandering for a state court to fail to enter the debate.
Perhaps the clearest example of the potential benefits of a state
court partaking in a dialogue with the federal courts concerning the
nature of discrimination in the workplace concerns the current
controversy over the continued viability of the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework. As the McDonnell Douglas framework
developed, state courts, for the most part, adopted the approach for
Because
use with their own antidiscrimination statutes.271
McDonnell Douglas was designed to provide an orderly method of
handling intentional discrimination claims and establishing the
parties’ relative burdens of production and persuasion, this
development made considerable sense. As time went on, however,
some of the shortcomings of the approach became more apparent.272
Now that the Costa decision has impliedly called into question the
distinction between single-motive and mixed-motives cases, the
federal courts are engaged in an ongoing discussion regarding
whether the old rules still apply.273 For all intents and purposes, the
federal standard has long been the uniform state standard, so state
courts are just as equipped as federal courts to enter the discussion.
Rather than burying their heads in the sand and reflexively relying
on a possibly outdated standard, state judges can and should reexamine their past positions to determine whether they are truly in
line with the goals of employment discrimination law.
3. Incorrect Interpretations by the Supreme Court. Given the
nature of constitutional texts, there is rarely one “correct”
interpretation of a constitutional provision.274 While a state
appellate court may disagree for any number of reasons with the
United States Supreme Court’s interpretations of the words “liberty”
or “due process,” it is difficult for a state court to say with a straight
face that the Supreme Court got the matter objectively wrong. In
270

Friedman, supra note 2, at 133.
See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
272
See Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers of Iowa, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1192-95
(N.D. Iowa 2003) (discussing lower courts’ differing applications of McDonnell Douglas
framework after Desert Palace).
273
See supra notes 105-119 and accompanying text.
274
See Friedman, supra note 2, at 134.
271
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contrast, statutes are generally more concrete in nature and more
likely to lend themselves to a conclusion that there is a correct, or
more natural, interpretation of the text. At a minimum, the range
of permissible readings of statutory language is likely to be narrower
than that of constitutional language. Where state and federal courts
work with essentially the same text, state courts should be less
hesitant about departing from Supreme Court decisions that can
legitimately be viewed as having been wrongly decided. In departing
from the Supreme Court’s holdings in such cases, state courts can
remain true to their obvious duty to construe a statute in the most
logical manner and act as defenders of the rights of employees and
employers.
Although only rarely can the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
a statute be categorized as being objectively “wrong,” there will
occasionally be decisions that come as close as possible to meeting
this standard.275 One such case is the Supreme Court’s conclusion
that to constitute a disability under the ADA, the impact of an
individual’s impairment must be “permanent or long term.”276 Under
the ADA, an individual with a disability is one who (a) has a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities, (b) has a record of such impairment, or (c) is
regarded as having such an impairment.277 This definition is
virtually identical to that used the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,278 the
ADA’s predecessor, which prohibited discrimination by any program
or activity receiving federal assistance.279 Even prior to the
enactment of the ADA, some federal courts seized on the words
“substantially” and “major” in the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of
disability to conclude that only the “truly disabled” were entitled to
protection from discrimination.280 According to these courts,
Congress’s use of the words “substantially” and “major” was

275
See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV.
1, 55-58 (2001) (noting potential for judges to arrive at erroneous conclusions regarding
meaning of statutory provisions).
276
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002).
277
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
278
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 7(6), 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 705(9) (2000)).
279
Id. § 504 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000)).
280
Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986).
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intended to clarify that those “whose disability was minor and whose
relative severity of impairment was widely shared” were excluded
from coverage.281
This view of the definition of disability became more common with
the enactment of the ADA. It reached its pinnacle in the Supreme
Court’s decision in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams, in which the Court declared that the terms of the ADA’s
definition of disability must be interpreted strictly “to create a
Despite
demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.”282
Congress’s use of the words “substantially” and “major,” the idea
that an antidiscrimination statute must be interpreted strictly flies
in the face of the canon of construction that remedial statutes should
be interpreted broadly.283
More objectively wrong, however, is the Court’s conclusion that to
constitute a disability, the impact of the impairment must be
“permanent or long term.”284 The Court offered little explanation for
this conclusion. Presumably, it was partly based on the Court’s
debatable prior conclusion that the terms in the ADA’s definition of
disability must be interpreted strictly.285 As further support, the
court cited to the EEOC regulations defining the phrase
“substantially limits,” which did reference the permanent or longterm impact resulting from an impairment.286
The Court’s holding in this respect is subject to at least two
substantial criticisms. First, the EEOC regulation cited does not
actually require that the impact of an impairment be permanent or

281
Id.; see Fuqua v. Unisys Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1201, 1205-07 (D. Minn. 1989) (noting
Congress’s use of these “important adjectives” and concluding that classifying plaintiff as
having disability would undermine purposes of Act); Elstner v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 659 F. Supp.
1328, 1342-43 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (relying on Forrisi’s reasoning to conclude individual did not
have disability); see also Oesterling v. Walters, 760 F.2d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1985) (concluding
that plaintiff’s varicose veins constituted impairment affecting major life activities of standing
and sitting, but did not substantially limit such activities); Pridemore v. Legal Aid Soc’y of
Dayton, 625 F. Supp. 1171, 1175 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (concluding that attorney’s cerebral palsy
did not substantially limit any of attorney’s major life activities); Stevens v. Stubbs, 576 F.
Supp. 1409, 1414 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (concluding that “transitory illnesses which have no
permanent effect on the person’s health” do not qualify as disabilities).
282
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
283
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 504 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
284
Toyota Motor, 534 U.S. at 198.
285
Id. at 197.
286
Id. at 198.
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long term. Instead, the “permanent or long term impact” of an
impairment is simply one factor to consider, along with the “duration
or expected duration of the impairment” and the “nature and
severity of the impairment.”287 Of course, in the majority of
instances, the fact that the impact of an impairment is short-term or
temporary is probably a good indication that the impairment does
not (in the case of an actual disability claim) substantially limit a
major life activity, did not (in the case of a “record of” claim), or is
not perceived as being so limiting (under a “regarded as” theory).
Impairments of short-term duration that have no lasting impact are
likely to be less serious.288 Thus, an individual with a broken leg
expected to heal normally probably does not have a disability
because (1) there is likely no long-term impact, (2) the expected
duration of the impairment is likely fairly short, and (3) a broken leg
is simply not a “serious” impairment in the same sense as, say,
diabetes.289 Nothing within the ADA’s language, however, compels
the conclusion that the impact of an impairment must always be
permanent or long-term.290 Indeed, such a blanket approach toward
determining the existence of a disability conflicts with the Court’s
prior admonitions that the determination be made on an
individualized basis.291 Nor does the ADA’s legislative history
suggest that temporary conditions are not covered under the
definition.292 Instead, there are numerous indications that Congress

287
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (2004); Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 100 n.6 (1st Cir.
2001) (“[T]he three listed factors can combine in a number of different ways, even to the
exclusion of one or more of them.”).
288
See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (2004) (“[T]emporary, non-chronic impairments of short
duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities.”
(emphasis added)).
289
See id. (discussing factors to be considered when deciding if impairment is substantially
limiting).
290
See Paula E. Berg, Ill/Legal: Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category
of Disability in Antidiscrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 19 (1999) (noting that ADA
does not limit “disability” to long-term or permanent condition).
291
See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (explaining need for
individualized inquiry when determining disability status); cf. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 100
(rejecting view that regulations establish “mandatory checklist” for qualifying as having a
disability on grounds that this would conflict with “Court’s heavy emphasis on the
individualized nature of what constitutes a disability for purposes of the ADA”).
292
Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 475 (1997).
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was primarily concerned with excluding minor or trivial
impairments from the definition.293 Although most impairments
that are of relatively short duration and have little long-term impact
on an individual are likely to be minor or trivial, there might be
limited situations (such as cancer) in which this is not the case.294
Moreover, if by “impact” the Court meant that a plaintiff must
suffer permanent or long-term residual effects from the impairment,
which is how the EEOC defines the term “impact,”295 the enunciation
of such a rule borders on the nonsensical. The ADA’s “record of”
prong was specifically included to cover those individuals who have
completely recovered from a substantially limiting impairment, or
an impairment that may have no permanent or long-term impact.296
Perhaps not surprisingly, some federal courts have ignored the
Court’s “permanent or long term” rule in the case of plaintiffs
proceeding under the “record of” prong and relied instead upon the
EEOC’s original multifactor approach.297
Thus, to the extent that inherently ambiguous language can ever
be interpreted incorrectly, a strong argument exists that the Court
simply got it wrong when it held that the impact of an impairment
must be permanent or long-term. Despite this fact, several state
courts have adopted the rule, with no independent analysis, for use
with their own state’s disability discrimination statutes.298 Where

293

See id.
See Barbara Hoffman, Between a Disability and a Hard Place: The Cancer Survivors’
Catch-22 of Proving Disability Status Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 59 MD. L.
REV. 352, 353 (2000) (discussing how cancer patients face discrimination in workplace); Jane
Byeff Korn, Cancer and the ADA: Rethinking Disability, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 404 (2001)
(same).
295
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k) (2003).
296
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (2000); see H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 52 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334 (noting that “record of” protection extends to those who formerly
suffered from substantially limiting impairment).
297
See McMullin v. Ashcroft, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1296-97 (D. Wyo. 2004) (basing record
of disability analysis on serious, duration, and permanent impact of impairment); Vandeveer
v. Fort James Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 918, 936-37 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (explaining EEOC’s factors
for assessing substantial limitation in major life activity).
298
Hallahan v. Courier-Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699, 711-12 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004); Hanson v.
Friends of Minn. Sinfonia, No. A03-1061, 2004 WL 1244229, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. June 8,
2004); Yamamoto v. Midwest Screw Prods., No. 2000-L-200, 2002 WL 1400106, at *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 28, 2002); Columbia Plaza Med. Ctr. of Fort Worth Subsidiary v. Szurek, 101
S.W.3d 161, 167-68 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); Kitten v. State Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 644 N.W.2d
649, 661 (Wis. 2002).
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a valid case can be made that another court has gotten an issue of
interpretation wrong, not simply in terms of the policy choice it
made, but in terms of objective construction, the state court should
not feel a need to justify a divergent interpretation on supposed
differences between the statutes.
B. THE CASE FOR UNIFORM CONSTRUCTION OF PARALLEL EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION STATUTES

In the instances described above, state courts may fulfill their
duties and remain faithful to the principles of federalism by
departing from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal
antidiscrimination law when construing a parallel state statute. In
many instances, however, a state court’s decision to adopt the
federal courts’ interpretation of a parallel statute with no
independent analysis of the state statute raises few concerns.
Indeed, in most cases, state courts should proceed from the
assumption that federal decisional law represents the appropriate
model for use in an identical or similarly worded state employment
discrimination statute. Despite the criticisms often leveled at
federal judges concerning the development of employment
discrimination law, there are relatively few issues about which it can
be said that the courts have gotten it objectively wrong. There are
many instances on which the consensus is that the federal courts
have more or less gotten it right. Where there is disagreement, it is
frequently at the margins or involves the types of policy objections
that a legislative amendment could correct.
Thus, there should not be anything particularly shocking about
the fact that, at least concerning these types of issues, state courts
often adopt a federal rule with no independent analysis of state
law.299 Where there is general consensus and disagreement exists
only at the margins, there is little call for dialogue. And where the
disagreements are inherently policy-oriented, the dangers implicit
in a divergent interpretation—such as creating unpredictability,

299

See Gardner, supra note 48, at 1059 (positing that most likely reason why state courts
adopt federal constitutional doctrine is “because they like it and think that it does a perfectly
adequate job of protecting the liberty in question”).
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frustrating legislative preferences, fostering legislative inefficiency,
and questioning the wisdom, motives, and moral authority of the
state court in question or the Supreme Court—outweigh the
justifications for divergent interpretation.
1. Legislative Preference Justifications for Parallel Construction.
One of the most common justifications for state court departure from
federal constitutional law is that many state constitutional
provisions either predate the federal Constitution or were borrowed
from another state’s constitution.300 Whatever force such arguments
may carry in constitutional interpretation, they carry far less weight
as a general matter in the context of the interpretation of state
antidiscrimination statutes.
By and large, modern state
employment discrimination statutes were inspired by or specifically
modeled after federal law.301 It was not until the passage of Title VII
that the prohibition against sex discrimination became the norm in
The majority of states did not prohibit age
the states.302
discrimination in their parallel employment discrimination statutes

300
See, e.g., State v. Smith, 814 P.2d 652, 662 (Wash. 1991) (Utter, J., concurring) (“The
fact that our constitutional provision was modeled after another state’s provision, and not the
federal one, indicates that it was meant to be interpreted independently.”); James D. Heiple
& Kraig James Powell, Presumed Innocent: The Legitimacy of Independent State
Constitutional Interpretation, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1507, 1512-13 (1998) (arguing that states should
not be bound by federal interpretation of parallel constitutional provisions because states
borrowed constitutional language from each other prior to drafting of federal Constitution).
301
According to one study, only twenty-two states had some type of employment
discrimination statute containing an administrative enforcement mechanism. DUANE
LOCKARD, TOWARD EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: A STUDY OF STATE AND LOCAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
LAWS 24, tbl. II (1968). Shortly after Title VII was enacted, state legislatures had two possible
models from which to draw: Title VII and the Model Anti-Discrimination Act produced by the
Uniform Law Commissioners. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS MODEL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
ACT (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws) (1966). In some instances, it appears
that state legislatures relied on the latter model at least as much as on Title VII. See Ray v.
Miller Meester Adver., Inc., 684 N.W.2d 404, 408 (Minn. 2004) (“Portions of the [Minnesota
Human Rights Act], including the sex discrimination prohibition, appear to be patterned after
the Uniform Law Commissioners’ Model Anti-Discrimination Act, not Title VII.”). However,
a greater number of state courts have concluded that their statutes were modeled after Title
VII. See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Zeltwager, 144 S.W.3d 438, 445 (Tex. 2004) (stating
Act’s aim to administer Title VII policies). The same is true with respect to the ADEA, see,
e.g., State ex rel. Goddard v. Phoenix Union High School Dist. No. 210, 96 P.3d 220, 223 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2004) (noting that state modeled its act after original version of the ADEA), and the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act. See infra note 305 and accompanying text.
302
See Goldfarb, supra note 36, at 91 (explaining that Title VII “went further” than most
existing state statutes by prohibiting sex discrimination).
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until the passage of the ADEA.303 Further, the overwhelming
majority of states that enacted such legislation adopted the ADEA’s
age limit of forty years of age or older.304 The Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA caused most states either to prohibit disability
discrimination or to amend their existing disability discrimination
statutes.305 Where states actually led the federal government in
terms of prohibiting discrimination, many subsequently amended
their statutes to bring their substantive provisions into line with the
In short, although state
parallel federal provisions.306
experimentation may have initially spurred congressional action,
Congress ultimately established the basic texts from which most
states now work, and federal law has long set the prevailing
standards in employment discrimination law.
At the same time, substantial overlap exists between the efforts
of state and federal antidiscrimination law to eliminate workplace
discrimination. Where a state antidiscrimination agency exists,
Title VII requires that a plaintiff also file charges with that
agency.307 Before taking any action regarding an alleged violation
of Title VII, the EEOC must notify the appropriate state agency and
afford the agency a reasonable time to act under state law.308
Indeed, federal officials immediately recognized the need for
cooperative and work-sharing approaches between the state and
federal levels after the enactment of Title VII in 1964.309
This overlap and contemplated coordination between state and
federal antidiscrimination law provides a reasonable basis for
estimating a legislature’s preference regarding the interpretation of

303
See H.R. REP. NO. 90-805, at 2 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2215 (noting
that twenty-four states had age discrimination legislation at time ADEA was being
considered).
304
See Brad C. Friend, Note, Bailey v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.: Creating a
Collateral Victim Doctrine Under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 417,
435 (2004) (“[O]nly a few states have age discrimination laws that allow plaintiffs under forty
years of age to sue for age discrimination.”).
305
See Long, supra note 11, at 625-27 (noting that with development of ADA and
Rehabilitation Act states began to revise their statutes).
306
See, e.g., id. (discussing state antidiscrimination statutes).
307
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (2000).
308
Id. § 2000e-5(d).
309
See LOCKARD, supra note 301, at 97-98 (noting how federal and state governments
began working together on problems they encountered).
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parallel statutes. One of the most basic assumptions surrounding
the interpretation of statutes is that a court should select the
construction that best approximates what the legislature would have
chosen had it thought through the issue.310 Regardless of the theory
of statutory interpretation to which one ascribes, there are at least
a few preferences that one can safely assume all legislatures share,
either on an informal basis or through a formal canon of
construction.311 For example, as a matter of common sense, it is safe
to assume that, where such circumstances can be isolated, any
legislature would prefer that a court choose the most reasonable
interpretation of a statute from a series of clearly inferior possible
interpretations.312 As a more formal matter, it is well established
that, at least in statutory law, dramatic changes in the development
of the law should ordinarily be left to the legislature rather than the
courts.313 While this interpretive rule is usually justified on the
grounds that legislatures are more explicitly in the business of
policymaking than courts, it is equally valid to justify the rule on the
grounds that, as a general matter, a legislature would prefer to set
matters of fundamental, substantive policy.314 As Professor Einer
Elhauge has suggested, some interpretive default rules are better
justified on the grounds that they track the preferences of the
current legislature, rather than on the grounds of original legislative
intent.315 Regardless, generally applicable interpretive rules are

310
See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
2027, 2049 (2002) (emphasizing importance of enacting legislature’s intent).
311
See id. at 2051 (“[M]any canons of constitution are generally default rules that reflect
what any legislative policy would want.”).
312
A more formal version of this informal assumption is the absurdity doctrine, under
which a statute should be interpreted to avoid absurd results. See id. at 2052 (defining
absurdity in this context as violating common sense or conflicting with statute’s purpose).
313
See, e.g., Veltman v. Detroit Edison Co., 683 N.W.2d 707, 713-14 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004)
(declining to depart from court rules because such departure would cause “a change in
fundamental and substantive law, a change better left to the Legislature”).
314
Occasionally, of course, legislatures explicitly delegate to the courts the task of filling
in the gaps in a broadly worded statute. Kaye, supra note 1, at 28. In other instances, such
as was arguably the case with the Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1991, the legislature
appears to have made a conscious decision not to determine what the law should be and to
dump the difficult choices onto the courts under the guise of legislative decisionmaking.
Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 497 (3d Cir. 1999) (Weis, J., dissenting).
315
Elhauge, supra note 310, at 2049-51.
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often merely common-sense assumptions about how any legislature
would prefer to see an interpretive issue resolved.316
In many instances, divining a legislature’s preference is not an
easy task. In the case of a state court reviewing a borrowed statute
or a statute involving substantial state-federal cooperation in terms
of enforcement, the task may be somewhat simpler. One reasonable
assumption from the fact that a state based the substance of its
employment discrimination law on federal law or otherwise followed
the lead of the federal government in addressing the problem of
discrimination in employment is that the state legislature liked the
substance of the federal statute and the decisional law as it existed
under that statute at the time of enactment. By following the
federal government’s lead, a state legislature can be presumed to
have believed that the substantive provisions of federal law
represented a reasonable response to the problem the statute
addresses. While many states have expanded the scope of their
antidiscrimination statutes by lowering jurisdictional thresholds,
expanding remedies, or even outlawing forms of discrimination not
expressly prohibited by federal law,317 the commonality between
state and federal law in other substantive matters is largely
attributable to the states’ decision to bring their statutes into line
with federal law. And where a legislature has adopted the
substantive provisions of federal law, but tinkered with some of the
jurisdictional, procedural, or remedial provisions of federal law, the
logical inference is that the legislature has done all of the tinkering
at the margins it cares to do and believed, at the time of borrowing,
that federal law was essentially heading down the right track.
It may be fiction to believe that a borrowing legislature would
therefore prefer that its own state courts prefer every subsequent
federal judicial interpretation of the federal statute over its possible,
alternative constructions. The initial decision to borrow federal law,
however, can reasonably be viewed as establishing a general

316
See, e.g., Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 938 (N.J. 1982) (assuming that
legislature would prefer interpretation of statute that saves statute from being struck down
altogether as unconstitutional); Elhauge, supra note 310, at 2053-54 (noting government wants
validity of statute “to maximize the satisfaction of the political preferences that led to the
enactment”).
317
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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preference in favor of future parallel construction of the state
statutes, provided that those constructions are reasonable and
generally consistent with the progression of federal law existing at
the time of borrowing. In other words, as long as subsequent federal
decisional law remains within the orbit of permissible constructions
of a statute and does not itself fundamentally alter the previous
approach to the problems at hand, there should be a presumption
that the enacting state legislature would prefer that state law
develop in the same fashion. If, however, the federal decision is
either objectively unreasonable or represents a dramatic departure
from the direction of federal law existing at the time of enactment by
the state, the presumption in favor of consistency evaporates.
For example, much has been made of the fact that the federal
courts have supposedly taken a much stricter view of the ADA than
of the ADA’s predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act.318 If it were true
that the federal courts suddenly did an about-face in interpreting the
ADA, then a borrowing state legislature could be presumed to be
concerned about the subsequent turn of events. In such a case, a
state court may justifiably give effect to the enacting legislature’s
original belief that federal law would continue to develop roughly as
it had under the Rehabilitation Act. Alternatively, a state court may
resolve the issue under any of the various approaches to statutory
interpretation. If, for example, federal courts had almost uniformly
paid little heed to the words “substantially” and “major” in the
Rehabilitation Act’s definition of disability and glossed over them or
announced a policy of liberal construction, or if the federal courts
had almost uniformly held that mitigating measures should not be
taken into account in determining whether an individual’s
impairment substantially limited a major life activity, the federal
courts’ subsequent handling of ADA cases would have represented
a substantial departure from pre-existing Rehabilitation Act law and

318
See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination
Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 91, 91-93 (2000) (discussing Supreme Court’s departure from Rehabilitation Act precedent
in interpretation of ADA); Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for
Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 111 (1999) (suggesting more rigorous approach by
courts in ADA context).
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would have represented a fundamentally different approach to the
problem of disability discrimination.
Despite claims to the contrary, federal (and state) law was not
clearly proceeding in such a direction when the ADA was enacted.
Decisional law under of the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of
disability was relatively scarce to begin with319 and more mixed than
some critics of the federal courts’ treatment of the ADA
acknowledge.320 Initially, relatively few individuals were denied
coverage under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.321 By the mid1980s, however, courts began to pay more attention to the terms
within the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of disability, sometimes to
the detriment of plaintiffs.322 Prior to the ADA’s enactment, no court
had ever explicitly decided the mitigating measures question
presented in Sutton,323 and several had stated that the
Rehabilitation Act’s definition called for strict interpretation.324
Indeed, it is more accurate to say that the arguments in favor of a
more generous construction of the definition of disability advocated
by some had not yet been put to the test when the ADA was enacted.
Thus, there was no clear pattern to which a state legislature could
point and say, “This is the way we want things to go in the future.”
Therefore, the tendency of state courts to adopt Sutton’s
mitigating measures rule for use with their own state’s disability
discrimination statute makes a certain amount of sense as a matter
of promoting legislative intent. Although Sutton involved a
fundamental question concerning the meaning of disability law, it
did not represent a dramatic departure from pre-existing

319
Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer’s
Financial Hardship Becomes “Undue” Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 391, 433 (1995).
320
See Burgdorf, supra note 292, at 439-49, 469-75 (citing numerous examples of
Rehabilitation Act case law in which federal courts took restrictive approach to defining
disability); supra notes 280-281 and accompanying text (noting focus of some courts on terms
“substantially” and “major” in Rehabilitation Act’s definition of disability); infra notes 384-385
and accompanying text (noting that number of federal and state courts had interpreted “major
life activity” narrowly with respect to major life activity of “working”).
321
Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 745-46 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (noting that by
1984 only one court had found plaintiff not to be handicapped).
322
See supra notes 280-281 and accompanying text.
323
See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
324
See supra notes 280-281 and accompanying text.
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Rehabilitation Act case law. Further, as many of the state disability
discrimination statutes existing at the time of the ADA’s enactment
were modeled after the Rehabilitation Act’s identical definition of
disability,325 it is difficult to conclude that state courts’ subsequent
decisions to follow Sutton were contrary to their state legislature’s
intent. This is not to say a departure from Sutton could not be
justified on grounds of legislative intent. If, for example, a state
legislature waited until 1998, the year before Sutton, to borrow the
ADA’s language for use in its own state, a reviewing state court
might conclude, based on the fact that almost every federal circuit
to rule on the issue had reached the opposite conclusion, that the
Sutton rule represented a fundamental departure from federal law
existing at the time of enactment. Nor should a state legislature’s
decision, standing alone, to model state law after federal law be
construed as a mandate or delegation of duty to the state court to
ensure that the two laws always remain on the same track.
However, only where federal law itself has jumped the track on
which it was traveling at the time of the state law’s enactment
should the presumption in favor of parallel construction give way.
2. Legislative Efficiency Justifications for Parallel Construction.
a. Pragmatic and Legislative Preference Justifications for
Parallel Construction. The presumption in favor of uniformity is
also justified by pragmatic and theoretical concerns regarding
legislative efficiency. The term “legislative efficiency” has several
possible meanings. On a pragmatic level, the term can be used as a
proxy for legislative preference. For example, one justification for
the substantive canon of construction that courts should avoid, when
possible, a construction of a statute that calls into question the
statute’s constitutionality is that the canon best estimates a
legislature’s probable preference: a legislature would prefer
“validation over invalidation.”326 Invalidation would necessarily
create “a vacuum in the regulatory scheme,”327 thus requiring a
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Long, supra note 11, at 627.
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,
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Lawrence C. Marshall, Divesting the Courts: Breaking the Judicial Monopoly on
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legislature to expend time and energy re-addressing the initial
problem.
In much the same way, giving effect to a presumption in favor of
uniformity when confronting the meaning of two identical or
similarly worded statutes alleviates the burden on state legislatures
to monitor and respond to every judicial decision involving a
question of parallel construction. While state legislatures may be
better positioned and more likely to “correct” judicial decisions with
which it disagrees than is Congress, state legislative resources are
also limited, and state legislatures remain somewhat “sluggish” in
responding to judicial decisions.328 Departing from persuasive
federal authority, much like departing from mandatory precedent,
imposes transition costs.329 Unless federal decisional law represents
a dramatic departure from its previous course, there is little reason
to believe that a legislature would want a court to create discord
between state and federal law as long as the federal interpretation
is reasonable.
For example, in 1998, the United States Supreme Court held in
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton330 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth that where a supervisor with immediate, or successively
higher, authority over an employee creates a hostile work
environment through sexually harassing behavior, an employer is
subject to vicarious liability.331 Where the harassment results in a
tangible employment action, such as discharge, the employer has no
affirmative defense.332 Where no tangible employment action is
taken, however, an employer may raise an affirmative defense to
liability or damages. Specifically, the employer must establish (a)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior and (b) that the plaintiff
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer.333
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See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 247 (1999)
(describing state legislatures as “sluggish when it comes to correcting judicial mistakes”).
329
See Nelson, supra note 275, at 63 (noting transition costs imposed by departing from
precedent).
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524 U.S. 775 (1998).
331
Faragher, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998); Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765-66 (1998).
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Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
333
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
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Nothing in the text of Title VII required such a reading of the
statute or even provided much guidance for a court. Instead, based
on common law agency principles and the policies underlying Title
VII, the Court struck what it believed to be a fair balance between
the rights and interests of the competing parties.334 Although
commentators have criticized various aspects of the decisions,335 the
criticisms largely involve matters of degree rather than attacks on
the basic assumption that only employers who fail to guard against
and respond diligently to instances of sexual harassment should be
held liable.336 A new paradigm may have emerged, but it was not
one that represented a dramatic departure from lower court
decisions or the Supreme Court’s own past pronouncements. As the
Court noted, virtually every federal court that considered the
question found vicarious liability when a discriminatory act resulted
in a tangible employment action.337 Instead, the decisions were an
attempt to restore order among the competing standards of the lower
courts in other situations. In addition, the decisions did not
dramatically tip the balance in favor of either Title VII plaintiffs or
defendants. In short, neither side gained a clear victory.338 Thus,
although Faragher and Ellerth may be extremely important
decisions, the approach that emerges from the two cases is better
characterized as a reasonable approach to a difficult policy question
than a dramatic leap in any particular direction.
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Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
See, e.g., Paula J. Dalley, All In a Day’s Work: Employers’ Vicarious Liability for Sexual
Harassment, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 517, 551-56 (2002) (criticizing Court for misapplying agency
law in Faragher and Ellerth).
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See Chamallas, supra note 6, at 373 (noting that thrust of criticism of decisions is
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The other noteworthy feature of the opinions was the Court’s
clarification of the concepts of quid pro quo harassment and hostile
work environment claims.339 As sexual harassment law originally
developed, courts attempted to draw a clear distinction between
harassment consisting of a supervisor’s conditioning benefits on
submission to sexual advances (quid pro quo harassment) and
harassment consisting of unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that
created a hostile and abusive work environment. The distinction
between the two types of harassment was important because
employer liability varied depending on which form of harassment
was at issue and the approach a court happened to follow.340 The
courts’ insistence upon a rigid demarcation between the two forms
of harassment was the subject of criticism before Faragher and
Ellerth341 and occasionally broke down in practice, as evidenced by
the facts of Ellerth itself.342
While the Faragher and Ellerth decisions created a bright line in
terms of employer liability depending upon whether the harassment
resulted in a tangible employment action, the Supreme Court
blurred the line between quid pro quo and hostile environment
claims.343 The Court stated that use of the terms may still be helpful
in “making a rough demarcation between cases in which threats are
carried out and those where they are not or are absent altogether,
but beyond this they are of limited utility.”344 Thus, the focus after
Faragher and Ellerth is less on the type of harassment at issue than
on the nature of the tangible consequences of the harassment.

339
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786-88 (1998) (distinguishing hostile
work environment as one that alters conditions of employment); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751, 75354 (noting difference depends on whether threat was carried out).
340
See, e.g., Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 493-95 (7th Cir. 1997) (en
banc, per curiam) (summarizing conflicting standards), aff’d Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
341
Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm,
8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 333, 335 (1990); Eugene Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo
Sexual Harassment, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 307, 308 (1998).
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Ellerth involved unfulfilled threats of adverse action, thus removing it from the
parameters of the paradigmatic quid pro quo case. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751. Despite this
inconsistency, some courts viewed similar fact patterns as fitting within the category of quid
pro quo harassment. Id. at 750 (noting approach of several members of lower court).
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See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08 (noting no affirmative defense when there is tangible
employment action); Ellerth, 527 U.S. at 761-65 (same).
344
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751.
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Nonetheless, the Court explained, “To the extent they illustrate the
distinction between cases involving a threat which is carried out and
offensive conduct in general, the terms are relevant when there is a
threshold question whether a plaintiff can prove discrimination in
violation of Title VII.”345 Thus, the Court’s de-emphasis of the terms
“quid pro quo” and “hostile environment” is less of a dramatic
paradigm-shifting event than a common-sense refinement of a useful
analytic concept, and lower courts continue to make use of the terms
in this context.346
Given the prominent role common law agency principles played
in Faragher and Ellerth, one might expect state courts to be
reluctant to adopt the holdings of the decisions. After all, as
“keepers of the common law,” state courts were in the business of
determining employers’ vicarious liability years before either
Congress or the Supreme Court entered the picture and might feel
no particular pressure to bow to the Supreme Court’s common law
rulemaking. Moreover, it took the Supreme Court nearly fifteen
years to formalize a standard for vicarious liability; in the interim,
many state courts were forced to confront the issue head on and
adopt their own standards. Not surprisingly, some adopted or
retained standards that were arguably at odds with the Supreme
Court’s standard in Faragher and Ellerth.347 Thus, adopting the
Faragher and Ellerth approach would require some state courts not
only to take a backseat in common law rulemaking, but also to
overrule or modify prior precedent.
In reality, even prior to Faragher and Ellerth state courts
frequently looked to Title VII federal decisions in determining
employer liability under their own state statutes.348 And thus far,
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See, e.g., Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755 (noting that often, “determinations of employer
liability under state law rely in large part on federal court decisions under Title VII”); Sangster
v. Albertson’s, Inc., 991 P.2d 674, 679 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (citing circuit court opinions
regarding conditions under which employer liability for supervisor conduct is automatic).
346

2006]

DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS

67

most state appellate courts confronting the issue have adopted the
Faragher and Ellerth rule, even when it has meant overruling or
modifying prior decisions.349 Where state courts have refused to
abandon prior precedent establishing a different standard of
vicarious liability, it has been on the grounds of real350 or supposed
differences between the state and federal statutes, rather than solely
on the grounds of adherence to the principle of stare decisis.351
Assuming a state court or legislature has not previously adopted
a more extreme rule, such as strict liability for employers in any
harassment case, it is reasonable to assume that the state
legislature has no particularly strong preference as between two
reasonable middle courses. Where the state legislature has made an
initial decision to borrow from federal law, the state courts have
subsequently looked to federal law in interpreting the state statute,
and there is no fundamental change in approach, it is reasonable to
infer a legislative preference to keep the state and federal laws on
the same track. As a matter of legislative efficiency, it makes more
sense to infer a legislative preference in favor of maintaining
consistency between state and federal law in such circumstances
than to infer that the legislature would prefer that the state be an
outlier in antidiscrimination law, thus inviting some of the dangers
of forum shopping.
b. Democratic Governance Justifications for Parallel
Construction. Another conception of legislative efficiency relates to
concepts of democratic governance. One commonly asserted
justification for active judicial decisionmaking in statutory
interpretation is that it fosters legislative deliberation of and

349
Bank One, Ky., N.A. v. Murphy, 52 S.W.3d 540, 544 (Ky. 2001); Ocana v. Am. Furniture
Co., 91 P.3d 58, 69-70 (N.M. 2004); Starner v. Guardian Indus., 758 N.E.2d 270, 283 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2001); Parker v. Warren County Util. Dist., 2 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Tenn. 1999); Padilla v.
Flying J, Inc., 119 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); Sangster, 991 P.2d at 681. But see
Vitale, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 219 (declining to consider whether Faragher and Ellerth defenses apply
to New York law).
350
See State Dep’t of Health Servs. v. Superior Court, 79 P.3d 556, 561-62 (Cal. 2003)
(explaining significant differences between FEHA and Title VII); Pollock v. Wetterau Food
Dist. Group, 11 S.W.3d 754, 766-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (refusing to follow federal standard
because state regulations unambiguously established different standard).
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response to judicial decisions.352 However, by articulating and
employing a substantive canon of construction in favor of parallel
construction, courts may allow the same type of dialogue. This
dialogue may in turn influence the legislature to reconsider its prior
statutory enactments and to be clearer about its intent if it chooses
to “correct” the court’s interpretation.353
Given the greater interaction between the judiciary and the other
branches at the state level, such a result is perhaps more likely at
the state level than at the federal level. Although dialogue between
the federal legislative and judicial branches concerning the courts’
interpretation of federal statutes remains a possibility, it occurs
relatively infrequently and usually only in response to decisions by
the Supreme Court. In contrast, dialogue between the two branches
at the state level is a more common occurrence.354 It is undoubtedly
true that a confrontational judicial interpretation departing from the
norm is more likely to generate legislative deliberation than is an
interpretation that falls into lockstep with the Supreme Court, but
the fact that a state court is reacting to a Supreme Court decision
makes it more likely that the reaction will generate notice by a state
legislature. Indeed, Supreme Court decisions may, even before
commented upon by a state court, generate a response from a state
legislature that does not wish to see the particular approach adopted
in its state. Such has been the case with several state employment
discrimination statutes.355
Given the long shadow cast by Supreme Court decisions, adopting
a substantive canon of construction in favor of uniform construction
would do little to impede, and might encourage, this type of debate.

352
Elhauge, supra note 310, at 2047-48; Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline:
Constitution, Canons, Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477, 504.
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Spiropoulos, supra note 28, at 919, 946.
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See supra notes 162-176 and accompanying text.
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See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Minn. 1979),
superseded by statute MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (2002), as recognized in Nietz v. Schaff Auto
Supply, Inc., No. C8-88-40, 1988 WL 36762, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 1988) (noting that
Minnesota legislature amended its antidiscrimination statute in response to Supreme Court’s
decision in Gilbert that discrimination on basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination prior
to passage of federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act); Long, supra note 11, at 634-35 (discussing
California and Rhode Island legislatures’ amendments to their human rights acts following
Supreme Court’s Sutton decision); supra note 260 and accompanying text (discussing
Massachusetts Human Rights Commission’s response to Sutton).
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In the absence of indicia suggesting that a legislature might actually
welcome such a debate, however, the interest in conserving
legislative resources should make state courts cautious about
choosing to create or allow discord between state and federal law.
Even though it is easier for a state legislature to “correct” a court’s
interpretation of a state statute than a court’s interpretation of a
state constitution, such corrections require legislatures to devote
time and energy to correcting the problem. And although state
legislatures are more likely to respond to judicial decisions than
Congress, the dialogue between the branches is still imperfect.
Thus, where the Supreme Court’s interpretation of parallel federal
law is reasonable and does not represent a dramatic lurch in a
particular direction, a general presumption in favor of consistent
interpretation may promote legislative efficiency while still fostering
informed debate.
3. Judicial Credibility Justifications for Parallel Construction.
A final reason supporting a presumption in favor of parallel
construction is that such a presumption is the surest means of
ensuring the credibility of both the reviewing state court and the
Supreme Court. Proponents of the new judicial federalism have
been susceptible to the charge that their decisions to depart from
Supreme Court precedent amount to results-oriented judging.356
Such complaints may sometimes be brushed aside when a court
construes the meaning of a constitutional provision, which likely
contains broad and amorphous language.357 A certain amount of
judicial decisionmaking in such cases may be unavoidable. In
contrast, statutory text is often more dense and more concrete.
Where it is not, legislative history and agency interpretations often
are. Thus, it is often more difficult for a judge who disagrees with
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a federal statute to overcome
the obstacles blocking a contrary interpretation.
In short, charges of results-oriented judging are more easily made
and proved in the case of statutory interpretation than in that of
constitutional interpretation. As such, the canon can preserve the
356
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public’s perception of judicial legitimacy in much the same way
adherence to the principle of stare decisis is said to.358 By
announcing and employing a canon of construction favoring parallel
interpretation, state courts can insulate themselves from charges of
judicial activism without abdicating their adjudicative duties or
engaging in “Pavlovian responses” to federal decisional law.359
At the same time, such a presumption preserves the credibility
and moral authority of the Supreme Court on matters of individual
rights. In the words of New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Daniel J.
O’Hern, where courts needlessly call into question the objectivity or
competence of the Supreme Court, “we vindicate the worst fears of
the critics of judicial activism.”360 When a question of individual
rights remains open at the federal level, state courts should not
hesitate to partake in the dialogue. When state law differs in some
meaningful way from federal law, state courts have no choice but to
fulfill their duties and interpret their state’s statute accordingly.
When, in those rare cases, it can be said in good faith that the
Supreme Court decided a matter of interpretation incorrectly, the
same rule applies. But where the choice amounts to a decision
between reasonable interpretations of the same or similar language,
deference to the Supreme Court’s interpretation preserves the moral
authority of the Court while allowing for the possibility of a
meaningful dialogue with the legislature.
C. EXAMPLES OF THE CANON IN ACTION

1. Issues of First Impression. The presumption in favor of a
legislative intent anticipating consistent interpretations applies
most strongly where there is no existing state court precedent on
point. The risks to the moral authority of the Supreme Court and
the judicial prestige of the reviewing state court stemming from
charges of judicial activism are greater in this context than where a
state court interprets its own antidiscrimination statute against the

358
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backdrop of state and federal precedent. Also, in such situations,
application of the canon will most likely further the legislature’s
preference.
For example, in 2000 the Washington Supreme Court chose not
to use the ADA’s definition of disability when attempting to fill a gap
in Washington’s disability discrimination statute.361 In Pulcino v.
Federal Express Corp., the court addressed the claim of an employee
with lumbar strain and a broken foot who alleged that her employer
violated Washington’s Law Against Discrimination362 by failing to
reasonably accommodate her during her periods of temporary
disability.363 Because the statute failed to define the term
“disability,” the most natural place to look for a definition was the
administrative rules promulgated by the Washington State Human
Rights Commission.364 However, because the Commission defined
“disability” in a somewhat circular fashion, the Commission’s
definition was unworkable in practice, according to the court.365
Having reasonably rejected the Commission’s definition, the next
most logical sources for a workable definition would have been the
ADA’s definition or any other definitions of “disability” contained in
Washington statutory law. In this case, these sources would have
yielded the same result: As part of its statutory regulation of
housing discrimination, a Washington statute required that the term
“handicap” be defined as under the federal Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA).366 The FHAA employs the same
definition found in the ADA.367 According to the majority, however,
to adopt the federal definition “would be to undertake a task more
appropriate for the Legislature.”368 Instead, the court devised its
own definition: An accommodation plaintiff must prove that “(1) he
or she has/had a sensory, mental, or physical abnormality and (2)
such abnormality has/had a substantially limiting effect upon the
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individual’s ability to perform his or her job.”369 Based on this
definition, the court concluded that the plaintiff had a disability.370
Pulcino is significant because, if applied outside the specific
context of failure to accommodate cases,371 the decision opens the
door to the uncertainty and forum shopping that uniform
construction helps to prevent. More significant is the Washington
Supreme Court’s apparent discomfort with the federal standard. It
is difficult to see why devising an entirely new definition of disability
is any less an act of judicial lawmaking than engrafting a definition
already in use in a state’s antidiscrimination framework. While the
Supreme Court’s interpretations of the ADA’s definition of disability
have generated controversy and are subject to question, the
Washington legislature’s past insistence that the term “disability” be
defined in accordance with federal law provides a fairly strong
indication that, given the dilemma confronted by the Washington
Supreme Court, the Washington legislature would have preferred
the federal standard.
Also lurking within the Pulcino opinion is the not-too-subtle
implication that there is something flawed about the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the ADA. The lengths to which the court
went to avoid adopting the federal definition, which happens to be
the definition employed by the vast majority of states,372 leads one
to the conclusion that the court simply substituted its own policy
views for those of the Supreme Court. Had the court been concerned
about the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the ADA’s definition
requires the impact of an impairment to be permanent or longterm373 (a rule that would have excluded the Pulcino plaintiff from
coverage), it could have decided the case on more restrictive grounds
or rejected this specific rule, rather than abandoning the more
general definition that logically should have been applied.
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371
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An even clearer example of the dangers posed to judicial integrity,
legislative purpose, and legislative efficiency by state court refusal
to adopt the federal courts’ interpretation of a parallel
antidiscrimination statute can be seen in state courts’ handling of
the ADA’s “single-job rule” announced in Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc. One issue confronting the Sutton Court was whether the
petitioners, regardless of the existence of an actual disability, had
adequately alleged that United Air Lines regarded them as being
substantially limited in the major life activity of working.374 The
Court’s resolution of the issue illustrates how the ADA’s definition
of disability has limited the reach of the statute. In cases brought
under the “actual disability” prong, the EEOC had concluded that in
order to be substantially limited in the major life activity of working,
it is not sufficient that an impairment limits an individual’s ability
to perform a particular job. Instead, an individual must be
precluded from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs.375 The
difficulty for an ADA plaintiff alleging that an employer regarded
the plaintiff as having a disability is that the definition refers a
court back to the “actual disability” prong: For a plaintiff to fit
within the “regarded as” definition, the defendant must regard the
plaintiff as having “such an impairment,” i.e., an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity. Read in this fashion, an
ADA plaintiff alleging that an employer regarded the plaintiff as
being substantially limited in the major life activity of working must
therefore establish that the employer regarded the plaintiff as
having an impairment that precluded him not just from the job in
question, but from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs.
The Supreme Court adopted precisely this interpretation in
Sutton. In Sutton, the petitioners merely alleged that United Air
Lines regarded them as being unable to perform the job of a global
airline pilot.376 Therefore, at best, they alleged that United regarded
them as being unable to perform a single job.377 As such, they had
not alleged that they had a disability within the meaning of the
ADA. The same day it decided Sutton, the Court handed down its
374
375
376
377
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decision in Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.378 In Murphy, the
Court applied the reasoning of Sutton to conclude that an individual
with hypertension that was controlled by medication did not have an
actual disability and that his employer did not regard him as being
substantially limited in the major life activity of working because it
only viewed him as being precluded from working at a particular
job.379
As was the case with the Court’s mitigating measures rule,380 the
single-job rule has been repeatedly criticized for narrowing the
ADA’s protective scope.381 In favor of the Court’s interpretation is
the text of the ADA, the EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance,382 the fact
that virtually every federal appellate court had reached the same
conclusion,383 the fact that several pre-ADA Rehabilitation Act cases
had adopted the same view,384 and some decent policy arguments.385
Even prior to Sutton and Murphy, several state appellate courts had
adopted the single-job rule, based almost entirely on federal
precedent,386 and at least four state appellate courts had adopted the
rule prior to the ADA’s effective date, often through resort to
Rehabilitation Act case law.387 In short, although the Supreme
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Bearshield v. John Morrell & Co., 570 N.W.2d 915, 920-21 (Iowa 1997); Sigurdson v.
Carl Bolander & Sons Co., 532 N.W.2d 225, 228-29 (Minn. 1995); Walker v. Montana Power
Co., 924 P.2d 1339, 1342 (Mont. 1996); Engel v. Mont. Dakota Utils. Co., 595 N.W.2d 319, 322
(N.D. 1999); Potvin v. Champlain Cable Corp., 687 A.2d 95, 99-100 (Vt. 1996).
387
Probasco v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 420 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Iowa 1988); Minnesota v.
Hennepin County, 425 N.W.2d 278, 285 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Cecil v. Gibson, 820 S.W.2d
361, 365 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1983).
At least one state appellate court had reached the opposite conclusion based on administrative
regulations. Pa. State Police Dep’t v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 457 A.2d 584, 589-90 n.12
379
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Court’s decisions became controversial once announced, the Court’s
ultimate position was already well established in the courts and
supported by the text of the Act and by administrative
interpretations. The only factors cutting against the Court’s
interpretation are some legislative history, which is decidedly
unclear about the issue, and some strong policy arguments based on
congressional purpose.388 At a minimum, then, the Court’s reading
of the ADA in this respect was reasonable, even if flawed from a
policy standpoint.
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Sutton and Murphy prompted
an even greater number of state appellate courts to adopt the singlejob rule, at least in the context of an “actual disability” claim.389 To
date, only the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has rejected
the single-job rule when interpreting an identically or similarly
worded state antidiscrimination statute. In Stone v. St. Joseph’s
Hospital of Parkersburg, the defendant-employer argued that the
plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient for a jury to conclude
that the plaintiff had a disability within the meaning of West
Virginia’s Human Rights Act.390 Specifically, the employer argued
that, at most, it “suspected” the plaintiff of being unable to perform
a single job.391 Because it did not regard the plaintiff as being
precluded from a class of jobs, the employer argued, it did not regard
the plaintiff as being substantially limited in the major life activity
of working.392

(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
388
Bagenstos, supra note 385, at 977 (“If taken seriously, [the Court’s] statements would
shield the employer who harbors the most extreme prejudices or acts on the most idiosyncratic
stereotypes.”); Mayerson & Diller, supra note 381, at 125 (“Imagine this logic in any other area
of civil rights and it does not pass even the laugh test. ‘No we don’t hire women, Jews (fill in
the blank) but you can get a job somewhere else, so what’s the beef?’ ”).
389
Seaman Unified Sch. Dist. No. 345 v. Kansas Comm’n on Human Rights, 990 P.2d 155,
158-59 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999); Delaney v. City of Alexandria, 800 So. 2d 806, 809 (La. 2001);
Gasaway v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 215465, 2000 WL 33391090, *2 (Mich. App. Ct. 2000);
Butterfield v. Sidney Pub. Schs., 32 P.3d 1243, 1246 (Mont. 2001); Garcia v. Allen, 28 S.W.3d
587, 599 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
390
Stone v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. of Parkersburg, 538 S.E.2d 389, 395 (W. Va. 2000).
391
Id. at 406.
392
See id. at 401 (arguing that restrictions on driving, carrying, lifting, and caring for
patients only applied to job of paramedic).
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The West Virginia Human Rights Act’s definition of disability is
identical to the ADA’s.393 Thus, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals was confronted with the decision of whether to adopt the
single-job rule announced by the United States Supreme Court over
a year earlier. The court’s official holding largely sidestepped the
issue and declared more generally that there was sufficient evidence
from which a jury could conclude that, based on the actions of the
employer, the employer regarded the plaintiff as being substantially
limited in the major life activity of working.394 Even though the
majority never explicitly rejected the single-job rule, the opinion
offers only a glimmer of hope for future defendants seeking to invoke
the single-job rule in claims brought under the West Virginia
Human Rights Act.
In reaching its conclusion, the Stone court put the question of the
extent to which state courts should defer to federal decisional law
decided under a parallel statute front and center. The majority
engaged in a lengthy survey of state and federal disability
discrimination case law, which it characterized as being in a “state
of ‘turmoil and diversity’ ” regarding the question at issue.395
Putting aside the question of the relevance of some of the state
opinions cited,396 the majority characterized the federal courts as
being split in their approaches to the threshold question of whether
an individual has a disability for purposes of the ADA.397 According
to the majority, “some”398 or “several” federal cases399 followed the
393

W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(m) (1998) (cited in Stone, 538 S.E.2d at 399 n.14). In fact, prior
to 1989, West Virginia’s Human Rights Act did not define an individual with a disability to
include one who was regarded as having a disability by the individual’s employer. Stone, 538
S.E.2d at 398-98. The legislature’s amendment of the Act in 1989 appears to have been an
attempt to bring West Virginia law into line with the then-existing Rehabilitation Act’s
definition or the recently introduced, but yet to be enacted, ADA definition.
394
See Stone, 538 S.E.2d at 406 (finding employer’s imposed restrictions and limitations
sustained jury verdict).
395
Id. at 402. The majority was careful never to state that any of the decisions it cited ever
explicitly rejected the single-job rule—the rule at issue in the case. Instead, it juxtaposed
several federal decisions that had applied the rule with numerous other decisions which the
majority characterized as utilizing a “less restrictive approach,” id. at 404, or as allowing a
plaintiff to go before a jury “to show that by being excluded from a particular job they had been
regarded . . . as a person with a substantially limiting impairment.” Id. at 403.
396
See infra note 407 and accompanying text.
397
Stone, 538 S.E.2d at 402-03.
398
Id. at 402.
399
Id. at 401.
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single-job rule in concluding that a plaintiff did not have a disability,
while “a number” of other federal cases allowed a plaintiff to reach
a jury on the question of whether the plaintiff had a disability by
showing “that by being excluded from a particular job they had been
regarded . . . as a person with a substantially limiting
impairment.”400
If the majority’s holding and characterization of existing federal
law are read in a narrow fashion, both are defensible. Indeed, a
number of federal decisions have concluded that evidence that an
employer regarded an employee as being precluded from a particular
job was sufficient to establish that the employee was regarded as
being substantially limited in the major life activity of working or
some other major life activity.401 In these cases, however, the
employers also perceived the employees’ impairments as so
substantial that they would have precluded the employee from
working not just at the job in question, but in a class of jobs or broad
range of jobs.402 To the extent this represents the actual holding of
Stone, it is entirely consistent with federal law.
Instead, Stone clearly amounted to an implied rejection of the
single-job rule articulated in Sutton and Murphy. The majority
opinion took aim at several federal decisions that used the same
reasoning found in Sutton and Murphy to conclude that employers
did not regard the plaintiffs as being substantially limited in the
major life activity of working and termed them “restrictive.”403 The
court then referenced other state and federal decisions that used a
“less restrictive approach.”404 Finally, the majority opinion clearly
aligned itself with those courts taking the less restrictive
approach.405 Thus, there can be little doubt that the majority
opinion represented a de facto, if not de jure, rejection of the singlejob rule in the context of a “regarded as” plaintiff.406

400

Id. at 403.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 916, 925 (W.D. Tenn. 2002)
(holding as sufficient evidence that employer thought employee was precluded from job).
402
See, e.g., id. (noting employer’s restrictions limited employee from performing many
jobs).
403
Stone, 538 S.E.2d at 402.
404
Id. at 403 n.20, 403-04.
405
See id. at 406.
406
This is certainly how one of the concurring justices read the majority opinion. See id.
401
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Perhaps the most unusual aspect of the decision is its
categorization of existing law. The majority of state decisions cited
by the court as standing for the adoption of a “less restrictive
approach” either do not stand for such a proposition or have only
marginal relevance to the issue of the applicability of the single-job
rule.407 The accuracy of the majority’s description of existing federal
law is equally debatable.408 More troubling are the decisions the

at 412 (McGraw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Supreme Court has,
regrettably, misconstrued Congress’s purpose in providing protection for persons ‘regarded as’
being disabled.”); id. at 411 (“Let there be no mistaking the fact that [following federal
precedent] would have the practical result of drastically limiting the rights of people to bring
disability discrimination claims, a result foreshadowed by many recent federal cases.”).
407
Of the ten state cases cited by the majority, see id. at 405 n.23, three involved statutes
with definitions of “disability” that were substantially different than those found in the ADA
or the West Virginia Human Rights Act at the time. See Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Fair
Employment & Hous. Comm’n, 651 P.2d 1151, 1154 (Cal. 1982) (discussing applicable statute);
Cisco Trucking Co. v. Human Rights Comm’n, 653 N.E.2d 986, 988 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (same);
City of Cleveland v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 648 N.E.2d 516, 518-19 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)
(same). Indeed, with respect to City of Cleveland, even though the Ohio state statute was
notably different than the ADA, the state supreme court had nonetheless cited the single-job
rule approvingly prior to the decision in Stone. See Columbus Civil Serv. Comm’n v. McGlone,
697 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ohio 1998) (interpreting Ohio statute by comparison to ADA). Of the
remaining cases cited in Stone, at least one could actually be read as adopting the single-job
rule. See Office of Occupational Med. & Safety v. Baltimore Cmty. Relations Comm’n, 594
A.2d 1237, 1242 (1991) (finding sufficient evidence that employer regarded plaintiff as having
“future handicap” that would “impair major life activities, e.g., earning a living” (emphasis
added)). One of the cited cases does not appear to implicate the single-job rule at all, although
it is from a court that previously adopted the rule and continues to apply it. Compare Howell
v. Merritt Co., 585 N.W.2d 278, 280-81 (Iowa 1998) (cited by Stone majority), with Bearshield
v. John Morrell & Co., 570 N.W.2d 915, 920 (Iowa 1997) (announcing the single-job rule), and
Vincent v. Four M Paper Corp., 589 N.W.2d 55, 61 (Iowa 1999) (restating single-job rule
announced in Bearshield). Three of the remaining cases were decided prior to the adoption of
the ADA, when the single-job rule was not as widely recognized. AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Royston,
772 P.2d 1182 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n v. N. Wash. Fire Prot. Dist.,
772 P.2d 70 (Colo. 1989); City of La Crosse Police & Fire Comm’n v. Labor & Indus. Review
Comm’n, 407 N.W.2d 510 (Wis. 1987). One of the decisions could be read as rejecting the
single-job rule. See Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 31-33 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying state
and federal law). The major life activities of walking and breathing were also implicated in
Katz, however, and it is unclear from the court’s opinion in which of these major life activities
the employer regarded the employee as being substantially limited. Id. The remaining case
arguably supports the proposition that an employee regarded as being unable to perform a
single job may proceed under the “regarded as” prong. See Turner v. City of Monroe, 634 So.
2d 981, 984 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (examining definition of “regarded as”). After the Stone
decision, however, that jurisdiction’s highest court explicitly adopted the single-job rule
articulated in Sutton and Murphy. Delaney v. City of Alexandria, 800 So. 2d 806, 809 (La.
2001).
408
See Stone, 538 S.E.2d at 403 n.20 (assessing federal case law). Of the ten federal cases
discussed and cited in support of this assertion, two, Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d
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majority did not cite. Completely lacking from the majority opinion
is any mention that whatever “startling[ ] divers[ity]”409 of
approaches may have existed at one point, absolutely no diversity of
approaches regarding the single-job rule existed at the federal level
when the majority rendered its opinion. Over one year earlier, the
Supreme Court had put an end to any dispute through its decisions
in Sutton and Murphy—a fact not mentioned by the majority in
Stone.410
Ostensibly, the majority’s lengthy discussion of existing case law
established that the court should not be “mechanically tied to federal
disability discrimination jurisprudence”411 and that there was
“substantial authority in state disability discrimination law” to

294, 303-04 (4th Cir. 1998), and Deane v. Pocono Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138, 145 (3d Cir.
1998), actually applied the single-job rule in the context of a “regarded as” case, but held that
the rule did not prevent the employee from establishing that the employer regarded the
employee as precluded from a class of jobs—a fairly common approach in federal decisions.
See supra note 402 and accompanying text. One applied the single-job rule in the context of
an actual disability case, but, like Cline and Deane, held that the rule did not prevent the
employee from establishing that her disability precluded her from a class of jobs or a broad
range of jobs. Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., 188 F.3d 944, 949 (8th Cir. 1999). Another case
involved a plaintiff regarded as being substantially limited in the major life activity of
speaking, not working. McInnis v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 207 F.3d 276, 281-82 (5th Cir.
2000). One case, Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981), was not an employment
case. Another contains language that could easily support the conclusion that the court
actually applied the single-job rule in the context of a “regarded as” case. See Cook v. State
of Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[T]here is a significant legal distinction
between rejection based on a job-specific perception that the applicant is unable to excel at a
narrow trade and a rejection based on more generalized perception that the applicant is
impaired in such a way as would bar her from a large class of jobs.” (emphasis added)). Four
were from circuits that either were already applying the single-job rule at the time of the
decision cited, compare Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 1999), with
Deane, 142 F.3d at 145; compare also Heyman v. Queens Vill. Comm. for Mental Health, 198
F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1999), with Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 647 (2d Cir.
1998), or were applying it by the time of the Stone decision. Compare Olson v. Gen. Elec.
Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 952 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying single-job rule), with Deane, 142 F.3d
at 145 (applying single-job rule in “regarded as” case); compare also Thornhill v. Marsh, 866
F.2d 1182, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 1989) (not applying rule), with Thompson v. Holly Family Hosp.,
121 F.3d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying rule).
409
Stone, 538 S.E.2d at 401.
410
The only hint in the majority opinion that Sutton and Murphy had ever been decided
appears in a citation in a footnote to a law review article that references Murphy in its title.
See id. at 401 n.16 (citing Comment, Too Disabled or Not Disabled Enough: Between a Rock
and a Hard Place After Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 39 WASHBURN L.J. 255 (2000)).
Sutton and Murphy were cited in the concurring opinion, but in a disapproving fashion. Id.
at 411 (McGraw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
411
Id. at 404 (majority opinion).
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justify a “less restrictive approach” to the question of disability
status under West Virginia’s Human Rights Act.412 The court offered
only two independent justifications for its “less restrictive approach.”
First, the court noted the truism that an individual’s ability to
establish the existence of a disability does not ensure that the
individual will prevail on a discrimination claim, because the
existence of a disability is simply the threshold determination.413
Second, the court relied on its previous interpretations of the Human
Rights Act’s definition of disability, which it asserted were more
expansive than the federal courts’ interpretation of the ADA’s
parallel definition.414 Assuming the accuracy of this statement,415 it

412

Id. at 406.
See id. at 402 (reflecting that establishing protected status does not guarantee
successful claim).
414
Id. at 404 n.21.
415
The majority opinion cited three instances of the West Virginia court supposedly
interpreting its own statute more broadly than the ADA had been interpreted by federal
courts. Id. One of the West Virginia decisions cited, Haynes v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 521 S.E.2d
331 (W. Va. 1999), certainly could be read to support the proposition that the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals had adopted a more lenient standard than the Supreme Court has
articulated in interpreting the ADA. In order to constitute a disability under the ADA, the
effects of an impairment must be permanent or long-term. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). Although Stone was decided prior to Toyota Motor, a
number of federal courts had taken a similar position prior to Stone. See Burgdorf, supra note
292, at 469-70 (discussing temporary disability limitation). In one of the three West Virginia
cases cited by the majority, the court held that “[a] ‘qualified disabled person’ who is protected
by the West Virginia Human Rights Act . . . includes a person who has a disability and is
temporarily unable to perform the requirements of the person’s job due to their disability, with
or without accommodation.” Syllabus Point 3, Haynes v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 521 S.E.2d 331,
344 (W. Va. 1999). In Stone, the majority characterized the decision as holding that “a
temporarily totally disabled person may invoke protection under disability discrimination
laws.” Stone, 538 S.E.2d at 404 n.21. If this were the official holding, the decision would
arguably have put West Virginia at odds with then-existing federal authority. According to
the official syllabus provided by the court, however, this is not what the court held in Haynes.
Indeed, the defendant in Haynes “[did] not contest that the plaintiff’s high-risk pregnancy,
complicated by medical conditions, met the legal test of a disability.” Haynes, 521 S.E.2d at
337. Instead, the defendant argued that it was not a reasonable accommodation to hold the
employee’s position open for six months while the employee was on leave. Id. The court’s
holding in Haynes, as articulated in the syllabus, is entirely consistent with federal law—an
individual with a disability who is temporarily unable to perform her job functions may
nonetheless be a qualified individual if some reasonable accommodation, such as a leave of
absence, would permit her to perform the essential functions of the position. See, e.g., GarcíaAyala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 647 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding request for
additional leave was reasonable accommodation). Of the other two West Virginia decisions
cited, one is (and was at the time of the decision) well within the mainstream of federal
decisional law. Syllabus Point 4, Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., 479 S.E.2d 561, 569 (W. Va.
413
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hardly explains the court’s refusal to consider, let alone mention, the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Sutton and Murphy.
Aside from the obvious concerns over judicial credibility, Stone
raises several concerns regarding legislative purpose and efficiency.
One of the concurring opinions in Stone correctly noted that the
presumption in favor of uniform construction established by the
borrowed statute doctrine did not apply because no “significant body
of settled case law interpreting the archetypal statute existed prior
to the enactment of the [West Virginia Human Rights Act].”416
Although a significant body of settled federal case law under the
Rehabilitation Act may not have existed when the West Virginia
legislature amended the Human Rights Act in 1989 to adopt the
single-job rule in the context of the Act’s “regarded as” prong, there
was certainly some federal case law on the subject.417 Moreover, the
most significant of these cases, Forrisi v. Bowen,418 came from the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals—the circuit in which the State of
West Virginia is located. Thus, if one sought to divine the intent of
West Virginia lawmakers in 1989, it might be reasonable to suppose
that they were familiar with Forrisi and assumed that the West
Virginia Human Rights Act would be interpreted consistently with
the Rehabilitation Act interpretation of the federal courts in their
state. Even if one is unwilling to attribute such a purpose to the
West Virginia legislature, the fact that the Supreme Court’s 1998
articulation of the single-job rule did not represent a fundamental
change in the law as it existed in 1989 should have been sufficient
to create a presumption in favor of parallel construction.

1996) (holding reassignment to vacant position can be reasonable accommodation under West
Virginia Human Rights Act). The accuracy of the court’s description of the third cited case
depends upon how one interprets the original court’s intent as expressed by the language in
its holding. Compare Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814, 819 (W. Va.
1990) (holding HIV-positive person is person with handicap under West Virginia Human
Rights Act), with Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1998) (concluding that plaintiff’s
HIV-infection constituted impairment, but declining to address general question of whether
HIV-infection is per se disability), and Rivera v. Heyman, 157 F.3d 101, 103 (2d Cir. 1998)
(“The Supreme Court recently confirmed that HIV infection is a disability under the
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . .”).
416
Stone, 538 S.E.2d at 410-11 (McGraw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
417
See supra notes 383-386 and accompanying text.
418
794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
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Finally, the manner in which the Stone court expressed its views
on the applicability of the single-job rule made it harder for the West
Virginia legislature to engage in a dialogue with the court about the
meaning of the Human Rights Act. Although there is little doubt
that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals rejected the
Supreme Court’s single-job rule,419 the official syllabus produced by
the court does not allude to this fact.420 Similarly, by omitting any
mention in the main text of the majority’s rejection of the rule, or
even any mention of the fact that the Sutton and Murphy decisions
existed, the court was able to partially insulate its decision from
legislative review.
2. The Effect of Prior Contrary Precedent. One primary difference
between statutory and constitutional interpretation is the extent to
which the principle of stare decisis influences a court’s decision.
This principle generally carries greater weight in interpretation of
statutory provisions than in interpretation of constitutional
provisions because the legislature is free to overrule a court’s
interpretation of a statute.421 In some respects, this greater
adherence to the principle of stare decisis in the case of statutory
interpretation would seem to be at odds with a general presumption
in favor of parallel construction of related statutes where a state
court has acted first in interpreting the provision in question.
However, the greater weight that the principle of stare decisis
normally carries in statutory interpretation should not be sufficient
to outweigh the concerns associated with divergent interpretation.
As an example, in 1996 the Supreme Court rejected the approach
of several federal courts and held in O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin
Caterers Corp. that an age discrimination plaintiff need not establish
that he was replaced by someone outside the protected
class—individuals age 40 or older.422 Instead, an age discrimination
plaintiff must establish that he was replaced by someone
“substantially younger than the plaintiff.”423 The logic of the rule is

419

See supra notes 406-410 and accompanying text.
See Stone, 538 S.E.2d at 392 (forgoing discussion of single-job rule in court’s syllabus
defining Human Rights Act).
421
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989).
422
517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996).
423
Id. at 313.
420
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largely uncontestable. As the Court explained, “there can be no
greater inference of age discrimination (as opposed to ‘40 or over’
discrimination) when a 40-year-old is replaced by a 39-year-old than
when a 56-year-old is replaced by a 40-year-old.”424 The fact that the
plaintiff’s replacement was substantially younger is a far more
reliable indicator of age discrimination than is the fact that the
plaintiff was replaced by someone under forty.425
When the Ohio Supreme Court considered the application of
O’Connor in Coryell v. Bank One Trust Co. in 2004,426 it faced at
least one hurdle to adopting the holding: Twenty-one years earlier,
it had adopted the rule discredited by the Supreme Court’s decision
in O’Connor.427 Compounding the problem was the fact that in the
interim, the Ohio legislature had amended the relevant statute and
left the Ohio Supreme Court’s earlier decision untouched.428 Thus,
if one places stock in the notion that silence on the part of the
legislature amounts to approval, the Ohio Supreme Court should
have been especially hesitant to reverse its prior ruling and fall in
line with O’Connor.429 Nonetheless, the court reversed its prior
holding and adopted the O’Connor rule.430
Rather than viewing the court’s reversal as a Pavlovian response
to federal law or as a usurpation of the legislature’s powers, the
decision should be viewed as comporting both with common sense
and with the best estimate of the legislature’s preference. O’Connor
was a unanimous decision and has been criticized only on the
grounds that the meaning of the phrase “substantially younger” is
not always obvious.431 It expands the potential number of plaintiffs,
but makes it more difficult for some of those plaintiffs to make out

424

Id. at 312.
Id. at 313.
426
803 N.E.2d 781 (Ohio 2004).
427
Barker v. Scovill, Inc., 451 N.E.2d 807, 809 (Ohio 1983).
428
Coryell, 803 N.E.2d at 789 (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting).
429
See id. (“Because the General Assembly has not felt the need to legislatively overrule
what this court has historically held, I believe that the law as established in Barker . . . is a
clear indication of Ohio’s public policy.”).
430
Id. at 787 (majority opinion).
431
See, e.g., Beth M. Weber, Note, The Effect of O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers
Corp. on the Requirements for Establishing a Prima Facie Case Under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 647, 659 (1998) (observing that circuit courts adopting
“substantially younger” approach have failed to precisely define that term).
425
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a prima facie case. In short, the Supreme Court did about as good
a job it could do under the circumstances. Why then would a state
court not adopt what is clearly a better rule? The only argument
with any force is the one raised by the dissent in Coryell: Because
the Ohio legislature had amended the statute over the years without
altering the rule, it should be presumed that the legislature
incorporated the prior rule.432 Judges have generally treated the
“ratification by silence” theory of statutory interpretation with
disfavor.433 Beyond that fact, it is at least equally valid to presume
that a state legislature intends, or at least would prefer, that its own
parallel statute be interpreted consistently with federal law where
federal law is reasonable and a consistent interpretation would not
effect a fundamental change in the state law. There is little reason
to believe that incorporating the O’Connor rule into Ohio’s
antidiscrimination tapestry would dramatically upset the balance
between employers and employees or otherwise substantially alter
the substance of Ohio law.434
This presumption would also help insulate courts from charges of
judicial activism when confronted with the choice of whether to
overrule prior precedent and adopt a federal standard. Departing
from stare decisis inevitably raises questions about a court’s
motives. State courts, however, are at least equally vulnerable to
charges of results-oriented judging when they cling to a previously
announced rule in the face of a sensible standard articulated by the
nation’s highest court.
For example, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Faragher435 and
Ellerth436 were generally seen as a mixed bag for employers and

432

Coryell, 803 N.E.2d at 789 (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 292 (2001) (citing Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 (1989), for proposition that congressional failure to act is not
equivalent to affirmative congressional approval of courts’ statutory interpretation).
434
When Coryell was decided, it was suggested that the decision was particularly plaintifffriendly because, unlike the ADEA, Ohio’s antidiscrimination statute allows agediscrimination plaintiffs to recover punitive damages. See John Byczkowski, Age Bias Rule
Has a New Tenet, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 6, 2004, at D1 (suggesting that Ohio courts
might become forum of choice for ADEA plaintiffs). The ADEA, however, does provide for
liquidated damages, which the Supreme Court has held were intended by Congress to be
punitive in nature. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985).
435
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
436
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
433
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employees.437 The question of an employer’s vicarious liability for
sexual harassment had rattled around the state and federal courts
for years prior to Faragher and Ellerth, thus giving courts ample
opportunity to develop their own approaches. While the federal
courts were compelled to fall in line with the Supreme Court’s
holdings, the only question for state courts that had previously
developed different standards was whether they should fall in line.
The Michigan Supreme Court was one of those that decided against
adopting the Supreme Court’s vicarious liability standard.438 The
court offered two reasons.
First, according to the court’s
characterization of pre-Faragher and Ellerth Michigan case law, the
standard for vicarious liability was essentially the same as that
announced in Faragher and Ellerth, with one distinction: In
Michigan, the burden of proof was on the employee, rather than the
employer, to show that the employer failed to take prompt and
adequate remedial action upon learning of the hostile
environment.439 Second, unlike Title VII, Michigan’s statute
specifically defined the concept of sexual harassment and did so in
a manner consistent with the concepts of quid pro quo harassment
and hostile work environment harassment—concepts that the
Supreme Court found to be of limited utility in Faragher and
Ellerth.440
It does not take a cynic to conclude that what was really going on
in this decision was that the Michigan Supreme Court preferred its
own rule over that of the United States Supreme Court. Adopting
the federal standard may have required the Michigan Supreme
Court to “shift the burden of proof from the employee to the
employer regarding whether the employer should be held vicariously
liable,”441 but the issues of whether the plaintiff took reasonable
steps to notify the employer of the alleged harassment and whether
the employer acted promptly to correct the harassing conduct will
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almost always be at issue in such cases.442 In short, the
disagreement between the Michigan Supreme Court and United
States Supreme Court was simply one of degree.
Moreover, the text of Michigan’s Civil Rights Act provides more
than a hint that the Michigan legislature favored a policy of parallel
construction.443 Even though Michigan’s Civil Rights Act, unlike
Title VII, actually defines sexual harassment in terms akin to the
concepts of quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment,
Michigan’s language, adopted in 1980, was clearly borrowed from
EEOC regulations in effect at the time.444 Thus, the Michigan
legislature appears to have deliberately set upon a course of parallel
construction when it enacted the Michigan Civil Rights Act. It is
therefore reasonable to believe that the legislature would have
preferred that the two laws remain on the same track absent some
strong indication that federal law had somehow gone awry.
Furthermore, as a practical matter, it is difficult to see why the fact
that Michigan’s Civil Rights Act actually defined sexual harassment
while Title VII did not should have made any difference in the case
at issue. The Supreme Court did not completely abandon reliance
on the concepts of quid pro quo and hostile work environment.445
Further, in describing the different standards for vicarious liability,
the court described them in a manner entirely consistent with those
concepts.446
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Of course, if the question of whether the employer exercised
reasonable care to correct a supervisor’s harassing behavior
promptly is always in issue, as a practical matter it may make little
difference whether the issue is framed as part of a plaintiff’s prima
facie case or an employer’s affirmative defense. But that is all the
more reason for a state court to adopt a federal standard. To arrive
at its decision, the Michigan Supreme Court had to (1) suggest that
the United States Supreme Court decided Faragher and Ellerth
incorrectly;447 (2) exaggerate the differences between Michigan’s
Civil Rights Act and Title VII;448 and (3) ignore the fact that
Michigan’s statute, which supposedly was markedly different from
federal law, was actually based on EEOC regulations.449 To arrive
at a contrary decision, the Michigan Supreme Court simply had to
overrule a prior decision that differed only in degree from the United
States Supreme Court’s standard. Thus, the question for the
Michigan Supreme Court was not one of correct or incorrect
interpretation, but one of legislative preference, legislative
efficiency, and judicial credibility—both its own and the United
States Supreme Court’s.
VI. CONCLUSION
The art of statutory interpretation poses special problems for
state judges. These problems are especially pronounced where state
judges are required to interpret their state’s employment
discrimination statutes in the shadow of federal precedent. The
United State’s dual judicial system and the controversial nature of
employment discrimination law have generated numerous issues of
statutory construction that defy easy resolution. To date, most state
courts have chosen the path of least resistance and relied heavily on
federal precedent to help resolve these issues. As employment
discrimination law becomes more complex and controversial,
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however, more opportunities arise for state and federal employment
discrimination law to part ways.
To deal with these situations effectively, state courts should adopt
a substantive canon of construction favoring uniform construction of
state and federal statutes employing identical or substantially
similar language.
Blind adherence to federal precedent is
inappropriate. But unless state courts can identify some meaningful
difference between state and federal law, some fundamental change
in approach at the federal level, or some outright error on the part
of the federal courts, divergent interpretation of parallel statutes
will generally produce more harm than good in terms of furthering
legislative preferences, legislative efficiency, and judicial integrity.
Accordingly, state courts should presume uniform construction of
parallel employment discrimination statutes.

